It should be noticed that the above rules do not cover the case of appeals from the Court of Errors to England. Presumably regulation of this appellate step was left to the gubernatorial instructions and acts of Parliament. There is evidence that the instruction as to security by appellant was not vigorously enforced, 281 although we do find security demanded from respondents to prevent suspension of execution. 282 In Jamaica, in addition to the Court of Errors, the Governor as Chancellor exercised power to make rules governing appeals from chancery decrees. We have seen that it was questioned whether the royal instructions as to conciliar appeals were intended to cover chancery appeals. 283 The evidence of the insular practice is conflicting. It was a chancery practice that twenty-eight days be allowed parties to elect whether to appeal or not; 284 the gubernatorial instructions allowed only fourteen days in which to take an appeal. 285 In appeals from chancery decrees, until 1732, there is no mention of security being given by appellant, 280 contrary to the royal instructions. 287 From the existent records son v. Pomeroy (Dec. 20, 1749; ibid., 83); Petrie v. Valette (Dec. 20, 1749; ibid., 87); Mathison v. Bayly (Sept. 25, 1750; ibid., 120); Sharpe v. Witter (Nov. 28, 1748; ibid., 122); Lindsay v. Raitt (June 28, 1751; ibid., 142); East v. Smith (July 24, 1752; ibid., 148). 281 On May 28, 1750, an appeal was allowed in Barclay v. Morley, and the respondent was allowed to proceed on the judgment on giving security. Appellant made a motion that execution be suspended until final determination of the appeal on giving security effectually to prosecute the same and to answer the condemnation and pay such costs as should be awarded in case of affirmance, but the court thought fit to deny the motion {ibid., 116). See also the following cases in which appeals were granted, but in which there is no mention of security being given by appellant: Richardson v. Gordon {ibid., sub Nov. 3, 1747); Barclay v. Rex {ibid., 16); McFarlane v. Hume {ibid., 37); Sharpe v. Witter {ibid., 138). 282 See Richardson v. Gordon {ibid., sub Nov. 3, 1747); Uniache v. Garrioche {ibid., sub Nov. 28, 1748); McFarlane v. Hume {ibid., 37); Crymble v. Crymble {ibid., 99). 283 See supra, p. 236. 284 See Pusey v. Clarke {MS Jamaica Chancery Order Book., 1767-68, 117) where twentyeight days is stated to be the usual period of election; Marshall v. Orr {ibid., 1774-77, 252); Lamond v. Jackson {ibid., 1774—77, 3 00 )- But compare Clarke v. Reid {ibid., 1767-68, 118), in which complainants were given three weeks to elect whether to appeal or to amend their bill. Also Bickerton v. Hall {ibid., 1773-74, 282), in which defendant, on July 20, 1774, was given one month to consider whether to appeal from the decree made in the cause, and on August 10, 1774, anodier month in which to consider, with the consent of plaintiff's solicitor. Liberty was also given to the plaintiff to appeal during the same period, if so advised {ibid., 285). On Sept. 6 an appeal was granted defendant {ibid., 305); on Sept. 8 plaintiff appealed {ibid., 306). But cf. the allegation by respondent in Cross v. Atkins (1763) that a party appealing to the King in Council was required to enter into security in 28 days to prosecute the appeal; otherwise no benefit could be taken of any order granting leave to appeal {Add. MS, 36,218/209). 285 1 Labaree, Royal Instructions, #453. Cf. the allegation by appellant in Peters v. Bourke (1762) that the ordinary time limit to take an appeal from a chancery decree was fourteen days (Case of Appellant, Add. MS, 36,218/ 161). 286 See Bravo v. Gabay (April 19, 1726, MS Jamaica Chancery Order Book, 1710-11, 1725-27, 106); Gale v. Gale (April 20, 1726; ibid., 108); Bowerman v. Hale (May 2, 1726; ibid., 108-9); Swymer v. Cargill (May 24, 1726; ibid., 119); Sutton v. Cargill (May 24, 1726; ibid., 120); Bernardiston v. Cavalier (May 24, 1726; ibid., 120); Bernardiston v. Page (Nov. 14, 1726; ibid., 145); Alden v.