to sterling. 239 In addition it is not clear whether the act contemplated 
an appeal per saltum in matters over and thereby ran counter to conciliar 
appellate policy. 240 The influence of 3 James I, c. 8, and 16 and 17 Charles 
11, c. 8, is patent in this Nevis enactment. 
In the same year (1711) an act was passed in St. Christopher reducing the 
minimum for Governor and Council error jurisdiction to current money 
from the customary current money. Appeals to the Privy Council were 
to be guided by the sterling minimum of the instructions. The same 
provisions were made as to appeals in the nature of writs of error and as to 
double security in all actions as in the Nevis act. 241 
Ten years later an Antigua act contained elaborate regulations of the appellate 
process, but it was more consonant with instructional standards. By 
this 1721 statute, writs of error to the Governor and Council were to be signed 
by the governor upon appellant's certification of bond given at the Secretary's 
Office, with two sufficient sureties in double the value of the matter in question 
to answer the debt or damages, with such costs and charges as should be 
awarded in case of affirmance. All such writs of error were to meet the instructional 
requirements, but in the absence thereof no limitation was imposed. No 
executor, administrator, or guardian was obliged to give security on said writs, 
except where required by the laws of England. Upon appeal to the King in 
Council the same exemption, with the addition of actions upon a penal law, 
prevailed, unless directed otherwise by the royal instructions. Appeal to 
the King in Council from the Governor and Council was to be limited 
by the royal instructions as to minimum limitations and security provisions. 
~ 
Returning to St. Christopher, we discover a 1724 enactment that the Governor 
and Council should exercise error jurisdiction without a limiting minimum. 
Further, no execution in personal actions was to be stayed by writ of 
error unless appellant by two sufficient securities was bound by recognizance 
in double the judgment sum to prosecute with effect, and to pay all debts, 
damages, and costs in case of affirmance. In writ of dower or ejectione firmae 
appellant was to be bound in such sum as the court judged reasonable. However, 
this security provision was not to extend to executors, administrators, 
or any popular action or actions upon a penal law or statute. An appeal to the 
King in Council was to lie according to the instructions, with appellant giving 
security as aforesaid. Apparently the exception in favor of executors, administrators, 
and guardians was abrogated in the case of appeals to the King in 
239 i Labaree, Royal Instructions, #448-49. 242 Acts Assembly Leeward Islands (1734), 
240 See supra, p. 226. 183, 197-98. 
241 Acts Assembly St. Christopher, 1711-3$ 
(i 739). 7-8-