for stealing two slaves belonging to the South Sea Company and defacing their marks, under a 1696 act for the better order and government of slaves. On the ground that the indictment lacked certain essential allegations, Tyler moved the court in arrest of judgment, but the motion was denied. Tyler thereupon prayed a writ of error for reversal of the judgment, presenting an opinion of five insular counsel that the absence of the essential allegations constituted ground for reversal. 131 The governor thereupon took the opinion of his Council Board whether such a writ of error would lie. The Board was of the unanimous opinion that such writ would not lie, as the instruction relating to appeals seemed calculated for civil causes only. The Board also expressed great resentment that counsel presumed so notoriously to arraign the justice of the bench and jury and attempted to lead them into a method of proceeding that was unprecedented, illegal, and unjustifiable. 132 In a few instances the Privy Council intervened in criminal cases not covered by the instructions —treasons and felonies. The earliest cases, the appeals of Nicholas Bayard and John Hutchins, were more in the nature of exercises of the pardoning power and will be discussed later. 133 In June, 1711, one Thomas Macnemara of Maryland petitioned the King in Council, praying that he be restored to the status of attorney, of which petitioner had been deprived because found guilty of homicide by chance medley, and that the record of his trial be certified in order to a reversal of the judgment. 134 Apparently the application was made because the Maryland Court of Appeals refused to allow prosecution of a writ of error by an unauthorized attorney 131 11 MS Mins. Jamaica Council, sub July n, 1728. Petitioner stated that it was not alleged in the indictment that the petitioner "did take and carry away" the said negroes. 132 Ibid. Compare the earlier Jamaica case of Brown v. Rex (1723), in which petitioner, alleging inability to procure counsel, prayed suspension of a ,£5OO fine until the matter could be laid before the Council in a judicial way or petitioner otherwise relieved. It was ordered that the Governor and Council be instructed to admit a writ of error and assign petitioner counsel and that if the appellate judgment should be unfavorable to petitioner, he might appeal therefrom (PC 2/88/469). 133 See infra, p. 297 et seq. 134 PC 2/83/256. For the proceedings in the Provincial Court upon the indictment for wilful murder see MS Md. Prov. Ct. Judg. Book_, 1709-10, 231-34, 398-99. For an account of the trial and comments thereon see CSP, Col., 1711-12, #101. It was related from provincial sources that "by reason of ye many Roman Catholic friends the said Macnemara had to assist him in tampering with and sounding the inclinations of the jurors returned, of whose sentiments said Macnemara on his challenges was well advised by them, he was by those that remained unchallenged found guilty of homicide by chance medley and on that verdict the jury persisted against plaine evidence, tho they were twice sent back by the court. But the Chief Justice and his associates taking into consideration the barbarity of the fact with the malice prepense according to evidence, by his acting without any deputation from the sheriff and that in his own case which made it malice implied in law and so murder, they concluded that the jury had found the matter which was the manslaughter, yet they were judges of the manner, and so gave judgment that he was guilty of manslaughter, and for grounds of such judgment relyed on the case of John Vane Salisbury in Plowden's Commentaries" (CO 5/ 720/118-19).