peal to the King in Council from the decree, and alleged willingness to give 
security according to the royal instructions; whereupon, plaintiffs were ordered 
to show cause why the prayer should not be granted. 116 
The first reaction of plaintiffs' counsel was that the appeal failed to meet the 
instructional requirements. 117 This was further insisted upon at a July, 1742, 
hearing to show cause. On this occasion the governor questioned whether the 
clause in the instructions relating to appeals to the King in Council did not 
rather refer to judgments by the Governor and Council in error. If, indeed, the 
instructions were silent as to appeals from the Chancellor, two points arose. 
First, whether the King did not thereby intend by implication to prevent 
chancery appeals; secondly, whether the King could even by express words 
deny the subject of the benefit of an appeal ad re gem or limit the time, which 
was in effect a denial. As to the first question, plaintiffs' counsel John Coxe was 
willing to believe such intent. As to the second, Coxe argued that if the King 
could not deny the subject the benefit of an appeal or limit the time therefor, 
then he supposed the court would be governed by the civil law, which allowed 
ten or at most fifteen days after sentence for an appeal, so that defendants 
would be equally excluded from an appeal. But what concerned plaintiffs 
more than prevention of an appeal was completion of execution. 118 
James Alexander, consulted in the matter, was of the opinion that the instruction 
afforded a new remedy, unknown to English practice. To claim the 
benefit of the instruction there must be compliance with its conditions in point 
of time and security. Since this novel remedy did not deprive the subject of 
previously existing remedies, Alexander was of the opinion that defendants 
had a right to appeal by petition to the King in Council or the Lords in Parliament 
as they should be best advised. But following English chancery practice 
there would be no stay of execution until the petition of appeal was granted. 119 
For defendants, counsel Kinsey insisted that the subject had a right to appeal 
ad regem and that the King could not limit the time or the sum involved. 
Further, argued Kinsey, the method of appeal was by petition to the Chancellor 
as in the civil law, and the English practice of the House of Lords was un- 
116 For the petition of appeal see ibid., Box 38. 
Cf. Fenwick Lyell to James Alexander, May 8, 
1740 (ibid., Box 4). 
117 It was advised that the appeal ought not to 
be allowed because not taken within fourteen 
days of sealing the decree and because the res 
(30 acres of nonarable land) was obviously not 
worth £300 sterling. As to the costs, they were 
only an appurtenance to the matter in question, 
and it was doubted whether they could be 
reckoned in the value. James Alexander and 
William Smith to Fenwick Lyell; May 12, 1740 
(ibid., Box 37). 
118 John Coxe to James Alexander; July 4, 
1742 (ibid., Box 2, $106). 
119 James Alexander to John Coxe; July 12, 
1742 (ibid., #33). For further discussion on 
the point that the mere petition of appeal to 
the King in Council or the House of Lords did 
not stay execution see Alexander to Coxe; July 
26, 1742 (ibid., #35)-