After the passage of the Quebec Act (14 George 111, c. 83) Governor Carleton 
was instructed, in 1775, to establish a Court of King's Bench with criminal 
jurisdiction, Courts of Common Pleas at Quebec and Montreal with civil 
jurisdiction, and inferior courts with criminal and civil jurisdiction in border 
districts. The Governor and Council were to exercise civil appellate jurisdiction 
where the matter in dispute was above ,Tio, with further appeal to the 
King in Council in matters exceeding ,£5OO sterling. The regulation governing 
these appeals and the provision in misdemeanor cases remained as formerly 
105 Action under these instructions was delayed until 1777, when an 
ordinance gave effect to the instruction, 106 although a gubernatorial commission 
for a Court of Appeals issued earlier in August, 1776. 107 This enactment 
of instructions in the form of ordinances was unusual in colonial practice, as 
we shall see. 
INTERPRETATION OF THE INSTRUCTIONS 
Turning now to the question of instructional interpretation, it has been indicated 
that a literal reading of the instructions as to appeals would seemingly 
preclude appeals to the King in Council in equity causes in those colonies 
where the Governor or Governor and Council acted as a court of chancery 
of original jurisdiction. 108 This matter was brought to the attention of the 
English administrators by Governor Hamilton of Jamaica in 1713, 109 but the 
myopic Board of Trade failed to see the alleged defect in the instructions. 110 
105 2 Doc. Rel. Const. Hist. Canada, 600-602. 
106 See 2 ibid., 679, for courts of civil jurisdiction; 
2 ibid., 690, for criminal. There is 
no provision in the latter for misdemeanor appeals. 
It should be noticed that an earlier 
1775 draft of the former ordinance gave the 
Governor in Council appellate jurisdiction in 
cases involving title to land as well as those 
exceeding j£io sterling (2 ibid., 650, 655, 
658). For a further ordinance regulating the 
method of appeals from the Courts of Common 
Pleas see 2 ibid., 682. 
107 2 ibid., 672-73. This commission embodied 
the instructional regulations. 
108 In the instructional chronology the clause 
allowing and regulating appeals to the King 
in Council immediately followed the clause 
allowing and regulating appeals to the Governor 
and Council (see Learning and Spicer, 
Grants and Concessions of New Jersey, 641; 
5 Doc. Rel. Col. Hist. N.Y., 137; 3 Col. Rec. 
No. Car., 106-07; 10 Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll. 
[4th ser.], 647-48; 3 Lincoln, Constitutional 
History of New York. [1906], 727). The connecting 
phrase was "and if either party shall 
not rest satisfied with the judgment of you 
. . . and Council as aforesaid, our will and 
pleasure is that they may then appeal unto 
us in our Privy Council." From this relation 
and connective language it is an inescapable 
inference that only causes before the Governor 
and Council in an appellate capacity were to 
be allowed further appeal to the King in 
Council. 
109 In a March 5, 1712/3, letter to the Board 
of Trade Governor Hamilton wrote that two 
appeals had been taken from chancery decrees. 
Before admission of these appeals he 
had consulted his instructions, but had found 
no directions therein relating to appeals from 
chancery. Further, he could find no precedent 
of such appeals ever having been made from 
Jamaica. However, since the value in both 
suits exceeded £500, he would not take it 
upon himself to refuse to admit them, being 
sensible of his liability to mistakes and errors 
in such cases (CSP, Col., 1712-14, #292). 
But he warned of an appellate flood, if chancery 
appeals were encouraged. 
110 Writing to Governor Hamilton on July 20,