ever, the problem here was not one of the insolvency or withdrawal of. respondent, but whether an appeal from an interlocutory chancery decree should prevent further proceedings in the Chancery Court. 80 Since one of the persistent horrors of contemporary English chancery practice was the cumulation of rehearings, the Council Order in this case is remarkable. This order, however, failed permanently to remedy the evil, for in 1755 the Committee represented to the Lords Justices that a practice had lately been introduced in the Jamaica Chancery of carrying on proceedings in causes after appeals had been taken to the King in Council. 81 The Lords Justices thereupon declared null and void all such proceedings except in cases where security had been given in accordance with the royal instructions. 82 This conciliar order also failed to extirpate the practice, 83 but it should not be regarded as pure bombast. We find that in Gordon v. Hill, heard in July, 1756, "the Lords reversed the orders of 18th and 24th May, 1754, first in point of form, because they by the rules of the Board were void, being made pending an appeal to the King." 84 Since the Jamaica Chancellor and Ordinary were the same natu- mittee report on this appeal (PC 2/97/431). 80 Counsel for respondents in Philp v. Crawford had argued in the chancery proceedings appealed from that if all proceedings were stayed by an appeal, the "practice might become an intolerable grievance for that if any interlocutory order might be appealed from and the proceedings thereon stayed every minute order made in a cause might be so and suitors thereby prevented from ever attaining an end of their suit" (PC 2/97/440). 81 4 APC, Col., #283. This order probably issued as a result of the flagrant proceedings in Price v. Bonner; see Case of Appellant (L.C., Law Div.). But respondent claimed waiver of the appeals by appearance at further proceedings (Case of Respondent, pp. 10-11 [L.C., Law Div.]). For cases in which it was necessary to petition for a stay of proceedings below pending appellate determination see Hassall v. Morse (PC 2/100/460, 467); Ba y'y v - Smith (PC 2/104/135, 155; Case of Appellant, p. 3 [L.C., Law Div.] and Case of Respondent, p. 4. [L.C., Law Div.]); Foster v. Dupouy (PC 2/104/379, 442); Pr i ce v - Bonner (PC 2/104/380, 443, 468, 492); Beckford v. Nunez and Aikenhead (Case of Appellant, p. 6 [L.C., Law Div.]). In some cases exceptions might be made to the general rule that execution was not to be stayed, if proper security were given by respondent. In Garrioche v. Uniache (1750) appellant claimed that the instruction should not apply in the case where appellant was decreed to make to respondents good and sufficient conveyances in law of the land in question, in such manner and in such rights and capacities as they were entitled thereto under the will of one Thomas Cardiff (Case of Appellant, p. 6 [L.C., Law Div.]). The Committee, upon the motion of appellant's solicitor, ordered that so much of the decree appealed from as ordered such conveyance be stayed until the hearing of the appeal and further Order in Council (PC 2/101/465). 82 4 APC, Col, #283. 83 See Case of Appellant in Williams v. Beecher (Add. MS, 36,217/123; cf. Case of Respondent, ibid., 130); Case of Respondent in Foster v. Dupouy (Add. MS, 36,217/216); Case of Appellant in Hyde v. March (Add. MS, 36,218/92); Case of Appellant in Peters v. Bourke (Add. MS, 36,218/161). 8i Endorsed upon Case of Appellant (L.C., Law Div.) Two reasons in point of substance also are noted for reversal. In his Case (p. 3) appellant argued "that the said order being made subsequent to an appeal prayed and allowed to this most Honorable Board from said order of 19 October 1753 and during the pendency of that appeal, ought, for that reason alone, was there no other, to be reversed, as coram non judice, and in contempt and defiance of the authority of this Board; and which is the only way that can effectually put a stop to this practice which has of late been exercised."