served that for the colonists the most important effect of the Council's policy not to be bound by the instructional limitation was the introduction of an additional step for litigants and one, of course, contributing to the expense of appeal by making necessary a petition for the admission of a cause below par value. Although the Privy Council usually adhered strictly to its rule that a cause had to be pursued through the various instances in the provincial judicial hierarchy before an appeal would be entertained in England, in a few instances appeals per saltum were admitted, viz., an appellant was allowed to skip the final colonial instance. 60 Furthermore, owing to a statutory confusion was limited to appeals to the King in Council {ibid., #458). But the £200 minimum diere still blocked an appeal, even in the absence of a policy of only permitting conciliar appeals from the superior courts of the plantations. This same erroneous reading of the governor's instructions occurred in Smith v. Rex (PC 2/94/601, 608, 616). This cause involved a £100 fine imposed in the Antigua Court of King's Bench and Common Pleas on July 22, 1735. The relief petitioned for was the same as granted in the earlier cause. In Tittle v. White no writ of error had been allowed below from the imposition of a fine in the Court of King's Bench and Common Pleas in St. Christopher in June, 1743. Again the writ of error had been denied as contrary to the governor's instructions as to appeal minimums. The relief granted was identical with that in the first case above for the same reasons of conciliar policy (PC 2/98/605; PC 2/99/3, 56). In 1749 Benjamin King of Antigua applied for similar relief from a ,£lOO fine in the Court of King's Bench and Grand Sessions, but no action is recorded as taken on the petition (PC 2/101/244). In Brown v. Bordley on consideration of a petition for leave to appeal from a Provincial Court of Maryland judgment, it appeared that the case was not yet regularly before the King for an appeal. It was therefore advised that appellant be admitted to bring a writ of error from the Provincial Court to the Court of Appeals or otherwise as he should be advised (PC 2/88/ 483). In Turnbull v. Topham the usual relief was afforded in a civil action in which the sum involved was under the £300 minimum (PC 2/102/437, 480, 496). See also Smith v. Buckley, where a right of office was involved, although the immediate sum concerned was under the instructional minimum (PC 2/103/ 324); Young v. Dunbobbin (PC 2/103/326). In Wall v. Jessup petitioner prayed that the judges of the Nevis Court of King's Bench and Common Pleas be ordered to sign a bill of exceptions and allow a writ of error to the Court of Errors with further liberty of appeal to the King in Council, but the prayer was refused (3 APC, Col., #488). In an August 21, 1770, opinion whether an appeal to the King in Council would lie in an action of debt in the Inferior Court of Common Pleas of Rhode Island brought by George Champlin (Comptroller of the Customs) for nine shillings, Attorney General De Grey stated: "I conceive the Lords of the Council will not per saltum hear the appeal if there are any immediate courts to which the error lies till the matter has passed through such jurisdictions" (T 1/471/131-32). Appellants must also have exhausted their remedies in the superior court of the colony. In Oulton v. Savage (PC 2/86/19, 93. 116) a petition for leave to appeal from a November 6, 1716, judgment of the Massachusetts Superior Court of Judicature was ordered dismissed, for on hearing counsel it appeared that petitioners had not applied for a review as they ought to have done and still might do according to the practice and method of proceedings in that colony. See An Act for Review in Civil Causes, 1 Acts and Res. Prov. Mass. Bay, 466. Cf. the action of the Committee in Cunningham v. Forsey, infra, p. 408. 60 See John Macarell's appeal admitted from the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas (PC 2/83/447; PC 2/84/251, 268). The date of the judgment appealed from does not appear in the Privy Council records, but it is likely that the February, 1710/1, act establishing courts was in force. Under this act the Supreme Court was the superior tribunal