appeals in the first instance to a "constitutional middle branch of legislature" 
was based upon the enormous expense and impracticability of conducting appeals 
to England, considerations favoring acquiescence in erroneous decisions. 
The precedent of Ireland, where the local House of Lords was omitted in the 
appellate scheme, was distinguished by the difference in distances from the 
final tribunal, the House of Lords in England. 435 
No contention was made that the colonies should have judicial autonomy. 430 
But the doctrine depriving the House of Lords of its proper jurisdiction, 
Drayton believed, was erroneous. This doctrine was that in questions concerning 
property arising in America the King in Council exercised original 
jurisdiction upon principles of feudal sovereignty. As stated above, it was laid 
down as a common law principle by Coke that the King could not personally 
distribute justice, having delegated his whole judicial power to the several 
courts. Hence, it followed that the King in person could not exercise an 
original judicial power upon principles of feudal sovereignty over the property 
of a common law country. 437 As to whether the common law extended to the 
colonies the modern position was that emigrating English subjects carried 
with them the benefits of the common law. Even if the common law did not 
"naturally operate" in the colonies, as contended by Blackstone, appellate jurisdiction 
based on feudal sovereignty ceased in the face of the long-standing 
factual operation of the common law in the colonies. Besides, the crown relinquished 
this feudal jurisdiction by charters granting colonists the rights 
of English subjects. 438 Powers vested in the crown by the laws of England 
were necessary for the support of society and did not entrench any farther on 
natural liberties than was expedient for maintenance of civil liberties. But the 
civil liberties of Great Britain and America would not sustain prejudice by 
appeals to the House of Lords, the Irish procedure being precedent. 439 The 
depriving statute of 16 Charles I, c. 10, extended to the colonies, Americans 
being included as "subjects." Furthermore, no colonial legislature could vest 
in the crown a power which Parliament ruled could not be exercised over any 
"subject." 440 
Drayton questioned why it should be a principle of law that in all dominions 
435 The American situation was also compared 
to the institution of circuit courts (Drayton, 
op. cit., 30-31). 
436 Ibid., 31. This was because "a dernier 
resort cannot be lodged in a dependant state, 
because the law appointed or permitted to such 
inferior dominion might be insensibly changed 
within itself, without the assent of the superior, 
to the disadvantage or diminution of the 
superiority," citing Vaughan 402. 
437 Drayton, op. cit., 31—32. The cited source 
of the doctrine is 1 Blackstone, Commentaries, 
231. 
438 Drayton, op. cit., 32-33. See infra, Chap. 
VIII for the conflicting theories of the extension 
of the common law to the colonies. 
439 Ibid., 33. This argument is based upon 1 
Blackstone, Commentaries, 237. 
440 Drayton, op. cit., 33-34. Appeals under 6 
Anne, c. 37, were recognized as an exception.