of vice-admiralty in the respective plantations, but in England, in Westminster 
Hall. Thus, it was conceived that no appeal lay from colonial viceadmiralty 
court sentences under the Navigation Acts to the High Court of 
Admiralty in England, because that court could not take cognizance—as soon 
as it might assume to proceed therein, prohibition could issue. 268 Nevertheless, 
regardless of doubts as to its jurisdiction, the High Court of Admiralty proceeded 
to hear the appeal from the condemnation of the Providence, affirming 
the sentence below. 269 
This judgment settled nothing, and as a sequel charges were made by Quary 
to the Board of Trade against proprietor Penn with reference to the contested 
admiralty jurisdiction. 270 Hearings were had on the matter, and certain questions 
as to the contested Pennsylvania admiralty jurisdiction were sent to the 
Attorney General and the Advocate General for their opinions. 27l Answering 
the queries addressed to him, Advocate General Cooke stated that breaches 
of the act of 1696 ought to be and were most properly determined in the viceadmiralty 
courts in the plantations, from which an appeal lay by express provision 
in the vice-admiralty patents to the High Court of Admiralty in England. 
Among the many instances of such recourse Cooke particularly recalled 
the late appeal from the Providence condemnation. 272 A month later Cooke 
seems to have changed his mind, for in a joint opinion with Attorney General 
Northey a contrary view was expressed. This later opinion stated that the 
1696 act did not direct establishment of admiralty courts in the plantations, 
but presupposed their settlement. It further advised that plantation practice 
under the instant act had been to sue for forfeitures in the various admiralty 
courts, that many unregistered ships had been condemned in such suits, that 
appeals had been taken to the King in Council from such sentences, and that 
the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts had never been denied on such appeal 
273 
2 ™ibia., 332. 
269 The Providence sentence was affirmed in 
October, 1701, and the appeal was dismissed 
with costs (CSP, Col., 1702, #178, 648). 
But this adjudication in the cause did not 
prevent charges from being leveled by Penn 
and the owners at Quary and other admiralty 
officers in regard to their conduct in the cause, 
especially as to the appraisement of the 
cargo (CSP, Col., 1702, #135, 141, 612; 1 
Penn-Logan Corres., 83-84). See also CSP, 
Col., 1702, #648. It would appear that in 
affirming the sentence below little attention 
was paid to procedural correctness. John 
Moore, the King's Advocate in Pennsylvania, 
wrote the Lords of the Admiralty: "I submissively 
leave to your Lordships' wisdom and 
consideration that, if the High Court of Admiralty 
should inspect these proceedings, and 
the stress lie on the form or method thereof, 
'tis past a question they will be nulled. How 
can it be expected that a warped, biassed, and 
ignorant Register . . . would methodize his 
records fit for the view and nice scrutiny of 
that most learned Court? So that, granting the 
ship unduly qualified, yet the absurdities in 
the entries will unavoidably destroy the Decree" 
(4 H. of L. MSS [n.s.] 7699-/702, 
337)- 
270 See CSP, Col., 1702, #356, 395, 462, 580. 
271 There was no direct question as to the 
matter of appeals. See ibid., #585, for the 
four queries. 
272 Ibid., #596. 
273 Ibid., #708. Cj. the views of Northey as 
related by Penn (1 Penn-Logan Cones., 116).