but inhibitions were secured by the owners from the High Court of Admiralty 
in England. 263 However, in one instance the party securing such inhibition 
was advised not to make use of it, but to submit to the judgment of the local 
court. 264 His suspicions aroused, 265 Quary questioned whether after a decree 
in a colonial vice-admiralty court based on the Navigation Acts the High 
Court of Admiralty in England ought to grant an inhibition. For, he posited, 
if the cause should be carried to England, it could not be tried in the High 
Court of Admiralty there, though by the 1696 act all causes arising from the 
aforesaid acts were made triable in the vice-admiralty courts in the plantations. 
Quary further desired to know whether the clause in his commission 
allowing appeals to the High Court of Admiralty was designed to extend 
to all causes whatsoever, whether cognizable in that court or not. 266 
Although not very specific in his answer, Sir Charles Hedges, High Court 
of Admiralty judge, affirmed the right of appeal to the High Court of Admiralty 
in cases concerning the Acts of Trade. 267 But by learned men in both 
the civil and the common law Quary was advised that Parliament had invested 
the vice-admiralty courts in the plantations with more ample powers 
than given to the High Court of Admiralty in England, since by the 1696 
statute all causes arising under the Acts of Trade were to be tried in the courts 
nor was the appeal ever entered (CSP, Col., 
1699, #138). In May, 1699, the Providence 
was condemned as not duly registered according 
to law (ibid., #426 11, III; Root, op. tit., 
102; 4 H. of L. MSS (n.s.) 1699-1702, 353). 
An appeal being moved for, Quary informed 
petitioners that an appeal lay to the High 
Court of Admiralty. It was moved that the 
ship and cargo be delivered to appellants on 
giving bond to prosecute the appeal. Quary 
replied that bonds signified nothing in the 
colony, since they could not be sued on, under 
pretense that there was no Attorney General 
for the King (CSP, Col., 1699, #426). For 
the owner's version see ibid., 1702, #150; 
cf. ibid., #178. See also that of William Penn 
(1 Penn-Logan Corres. 36). 
203 4 H. of L. MSS (n.s.) 1699-1702, 331-32, 
334. Reliance was placed upon Penn's influence 
at court to have the ships cleared (ibid., 
318). See also ibid., 336, for a statement of 
reliance upon reversals in England. 
204 Ibid., 325. 
265 Knowing the prejudice of the persons who 
had secured the inhibition, Quary concluded 
that the appeal was declined from conviction 
of application to the wrong appellate jurisdiction 
(ibid., 332). 
266 Ibid., 325. This argument is based upon 
the language of the 1696 statute which restricted 
suits for penalties in England to "His 
Majesty's Courts of Record at Westminster," 
whereas in the plantations, suits could be 
brought in any court under one section and 
in the Admiralty Court specifically under another. 
See 7 and 8 William 111, c. 22, ss. 2, 7. 
But it has been claimed in some quarters that 
the High Court of Admiralty possessed an 
original inherent jurisdiction over violations 
of the Navigation Acts, regardless of statute; 
see The Sarah (8 Wheaton 391, note, pp. 
396-97). As to Admiralty Courts not constituting 
courts of record, see Coke, Fourth Institute, 
135; Crump, op. cit., 130-32; Harper, 
op. cit., 186—87. F° r specimen commissions to 
vice-admiralty court judges see supra, Chap. 11, 
n. 97. The clause reads: "saving, nevertheless, 
the right of appealing to our aforesaid High 
Court of Admiralty of England, and to the 
Judge or President of the said courts, for the 
time being." See also the similar clauses in 
commissions to governors as Vice-Admirals, 
supra, Chapter 11, n. 97. Compare the myopic 
view in Lewis, The Courts of Pennsylvania in 
the Seventeenth Century, 5 Pa. Mag. Hist, 
and Biog. (1881), 178. 
267 4 H. of L. MSS (n.s.), 1699-1702, 331-35.