examined the most important of the ancillary reinforcing devices—the manipulation of the crown's power of disallowing provincial legislation which was designed to limit or prevent appeals. The significance of this phase of the prerogative is very great, because by disallowance the colonists were cut off from their favorite means of making "adjustments" to suit their own ends and were cast upon the dodges available in contemporary procedure. Some of the colonial acts were artfully conceived. For example, in August, 1704, the Council Board disallowed a Bermuda act for the liberty of the subject. 238 As to this law, it had been represented that if the statute of 16 Charles I, c. 10, should be in force in the island as declared by the act in question, "the jurisdiction and authority of the Queen in Council in making any determination concerning any lands, tenements, goods or chatles upon appeal, or otherwise is wholly laid aside." 239 Several Massachusetts acts were disallowed which attempted to give statutory form to the charter provision which as we have seen only mentioned appeals in personal actions. 240 In the colony of New Hampshire three acts were disallowed in November, 1706, which were construed as denying appeals to the King in Council. A 1699 act establishing a judicial system provided for appeals from the Superior Court to the King in Council provided the matter in difference exceeded The Board of Trade, in recommending disallowance, interpreted the act as preventing the King from allowing an appeal for less value, thus restraining proper exercise of the prerogative. 241 A 1701 238 PC 2/80/158. 239 CSP, Col., 1702-3, #1356. But compare infra, pp. 638-39, conciliar action upon an attempt of the Barbados Governor and Council to exercise original jurisdiction. 240 A provincial act of Nov. 25, 1692, entitled An Act for the Establ'ing of Judicatories and Courts of Justice Within this Province, provided that if either party was dissatisfied with the judgment or sentence of any of the judicatories or courts previously mentioned in the act in personal actions wherein the matter in difference exceeded the value of sterling (and no other), he might appeal to their Majesties in Council, such appeal being made in time and security given according to the charter directions in that behalf (1 Acts and Res. Prov. Mass. Bay, 76). The Act was disallowed by the Privy Council on Aug. 22, 1695, on the ground that the limitation of appeals to personal actions exceeding .£3OO sterling was not according to the words of the charter and appeals in real actions were thereby seemingly excluded (PC 2/76/196). It is difficult to find any validity in the grounds advanced for the disallowance. A 1697 Act for Establishing of Courts (1 Acts and Res. Prov. Mass. Bay, 285) containing a similar appeal provision was also disallowed, but for other reasons {PC 2/77/271-73; 1 Acts and Res. Prov. Mass. Bay, 287). A May, 1699, Act for the Regulating and Directing the Proceedings in the Courts of Justice Established within This Province made no specific provision for appeals to the King in Council, but contained a clause "saving always the liberty of appeal unto his majesty in council, as by his majesty's royal charter in that behalf is provided" (1 Acts and Res. Prov. Mass. Bay, 373). But this act was disallowed in Oct., 1700 (PC 2/78/89). A December, 1693, Act for a New Establishment and Regulation of the Chancery was also disallowed in December, 1696, as excluding appeals in real actions (1 Acts and Res. Prov. Mass. Bay, 144-45). 241 For the disallowance of the three acts see 1 Laws of N.H., 866-67; see also the report of Attorney General Northey thereon (ibid., 646-47). For the 1699 act see ibid., 660.