three fundamental propositions—that the Isle of Man was no part of the realm 
of England, that it was not governed by the laws of England, but by law and 
usages of its own, and that the crown by letters patent had granted dominion 
of the isle to ancestors of the present proprietor without reservation of any 
appeal. Appeals or writs of error (which in this question were much of the 
same nature) had been allowed from dominions of the crown which, if not 
part of the realm, were governed by the laws of England, and also from dominions 
of the crown not governed by the laws of England, but part of the 
realm. No instance of appeal existed where dominions were not part of the 
realm or governed by the same laws, especially where no power of appeal from 
the dominion sovereign was reserved. 228 Although the plantations were governed 
by the laws of England, appeals were by express words reserved in the 
gubernatorial commissions. The King was so jealous of the appeal power that 
in the case of the counties palatine, as well as the plantations, appeals were 
still reserved, even though it was questionable whether the people there, in 
the former at least, could be deprived of the right of appeal. The situation of 
the Isle of Man was more comparable to that of the kingdom of Scotland, 
which was a distinct kingdom governed by its own laws, although devolved 
upon the same sovereign as the kingdom of England. Yet Scotland had its 
own court of ultimate resort, no appeal lying to the English courts or to the 
King in Council in England. 229 Where acts of Parliament granted jurisdiction 
and no appeal was reserved, then no right of appeal existed. In the act of 7 
[sic] 23 ° James I establishing the isle in the Earl of Derby no appeal was reserved, 
so none lay. This was analogous to the jurisdiction given by Parliament 
to justices of the peace, to the Commissioners of Sewers, to Commissioners 
of the Excise, and to visitors for colleges or hospitals from which no appeal 
existed. There was nothing in the laws of England prohibiting establishment 
of final appeal in an office lower than the King in Council. From the courts 
of the Cinque Ports a final appeal lay to the Constable of Dover, the Lord 
Warden of those ports; from the Court of Stannaries final appeal was to the 
Prince of Wales; if no prince existed, to the King and Council. Furthermore, 
it was more logical to vest final appellate power in the Earl of Derby, since 
the property was his and he judged between his tenants, as formerly on the 
manors. It was also more reasonable in that different law prevailed there, necessitating 
a judge on or near the isle, well skilled in its customs. Such practice 
Toms, and Ordinances of the Isle of Man (12 
Manx Soc. Pub., 1867, comp. J. Parr, ed. J. 
Gell), 88. 
228 Rawlinson MS, C 441/59-64 (Notes of 
Comyns on the argument). See also the document 
of the respondent headed "The Case of 
the Isle of Man" in Rawlinson MS, C 441/47. 
229 Rawlinson MS, C 441/59-64. 
230 The correct date is 8 James I. For a copy 
of the act see 1 Abstract of the Laws . . . of 
the Isle of Man, 61.