himself and his evidence to appear without molestation at the appeal hearing. 
The petition was referred to the crown law officers to report how far any 
appeal lay from the Isle of Man. 222 
The crown law officers represented that 
in regard the Earle of Derby holds the Isle of Man by grant from your Majesty's 
predecessor King Henry IV by homage and other services; we are humbly of 
opinion that although there is no reservation in such grants of any appeals to your 
Majesty, yet that an appeal doth lie to your Majesty in Councill as a right inherent 
in the Crown from the decrees and judgments given in the Isle of Man and that it 
may be proper for your Majesty to gratify petitioner according to the prayer of his 
petition, he giving security here (or in the island) to answer costs to the respondent 
in case the decree should be affirmed. 
This was accordingly ordered in Council. 223 
Hearing of the appeal was delayed by difficulty in securing authenticated 
copies of all necessary evidence in the cause, 224 but on July 13, 1716, the Committee 
heard the appeal argued by counsel. 225 However, judgment on the 
merits was deferred until the Council had considered whether an appeal 
properly lay before the Committee. At a further hearing then, on November 
4,1716, counsel were heard on the question whether an appeal lay to the King 
in Council. 226 Counsel for appellant, Peere Williams, urged that although in 
the grant of Henry IV to the Earl of Derby's ancestors there was no reservation 
of the subject's right of appeal to the crown, the liberty was plainly implied. 
Such liberty of appeal lay in all cases wherein there was a tenure of the 
crown, and it was the right of the subject to appeal to the sovereign to redress 
a wrong done in any court of justice. Any express words in the grant excluding 
appeals would have been void, because the subject had an inherent right to 
apply to the crown for justice. 227 
John Comyns, counsel for respondent Corren, based his main argument on 
222 PC 2/85/189. 
223 PC 2/85/231. The decree complained of 
was made by the Earl of Derby on July 6, 
1706, and directed that one John Corren be 
put into immediate possession of an estate 
called Reynolds-way and that he and his heirs 
should hold it without interference from the 
appellant and his heirs. Notice of the petition 
was given the Earl, who declared that he 
would submit the matter to the King in 
Council, but that if an appeal were admitted, 
he hoped for the sake of justice that security 
would be given by appellant to answer costs 
in case of affirmance. A marginal notation in 
the Privy Council register shows a bond of 
posted on June 30, 1715. Cf. the report 
of the appeal in i Peere Williams 329 as to 
the submission point. 
mpC 2/85/341. 
225 PC 2/85/433. See Rawlinson MS, C 441/ 
45-46, for respondent's printed Case. Reliance 
in the "brief" is solely upon the contention 
that the Earl of Derby was ultimate judge and 
that no writ of error or appeal lay from his 
judgment. 
228 PC 2/85/466. 
227 1 Peere Williams 329. For 1653/4 recognition 
of the right of appeal from the decree 
of Lord Fairfax, insular patentee, to Protector 
Cromwell, see 1 Abstract of the Laws, Cus-