charter ("wherein the matter in difference doth exceed the value of 
sterling") was explanatory of the personal actions in which an appeal should 
be allowed. Furthermore, Bowdoin understood it to be Charles Pratt's opinion 
that all the King's subjects had individually an indefeasible right by the 
English constitution to appeal to him in all cases, and that this right would 
have remained even though the charter had in the fullest manner denied an 
appeal. It was further argued that the Kennebec grant having been made to 
the colony of New Plymouth, its bounds were properly determinable by the 
King in the same manner as the disputed boundary of any other colony. 
Bowdoin concluded by stating that particularly in Rhode Island frequent appeals 
in land cases were taken to the King in Council. 193 
The King in Council proceeded to hear the cause ex parte, and on June 14, 
1771, reversed the judgment below, with leave to the parties to proceed to a 
new trial. 194 It appears that the reason for the reversal was the admission in 
evidence of Indian deeds in the face of a provincial law making them void. 
This objection had been raised by counsel James Otis in the Superior Court 
of Judicature, but Chief Justice Hutchinson had convinced his brethren and 
Otis that the act truly construed did not extend to lands in the eastern country. 
Lack of money combined with persuasion that a decree of reversal would never 
be carried into execution to bar presentation of this construction before the 
Privy Council. Hutchinson hoped that some way might be found to bring the 
matter before the King in Council again without going through a new trial 
in the colony. But he cautioned against directing administrative attention to 
this dispute concerning appeals in real actions and to the potential opposition 
to execution of the reversing order until other points were more fully settled. 195 
The colony also jealously guarded the ,£3OO charter minimum for appeals 
in personal causes. As we shall see in Leighton v. Frost, strenuous resistance 
was made to abrogation of this minimum by the King upon individual application 
196 It was suggested in that cause that appeals be allowed in all cases 
arising from wood cutting under royal license, although the amount involved 
193 Bowdoin-Temple Papers, 9 Mass. Hist. Soc. 
Coll. (6th ser.), 138-39. Bowdoin later wrote 
that the cause was deliberately made a personal 
action to obviate objections arising from 
the charter provisions, but that "it was said 
at the same time that in fact it did allow of 
such appeals" (ibid., 157). See also ibid., 212. 
The appointment of Bowdoin as colony agent 
was objected to on the ground that he was 
manager of the Plymouth Company, "who 
were endeavering to carry the trial of real 
estate before the King in Council" (Samuel 
Cooper to Thomas Pownall, Sept. 8, 1769 
[8 AHR, 310] ). 
194 PC 2/115/264, 274. The appeal was apparently 
financed on behalf of the Kennebec 
Proprietors by John Hancock. See Baxter, The 
House of Hancock. (1945), 209. 
195 27 MS Mass. Archives {Hutchinson's 
Letters, 1770-74), 229 (Sept., 1771). For the 
Provincial act see 1 Acts and Res. Prov. Mass. 
Bay, 471. Cf. on the question of statutory 
interpretation, The Proprietors Holding under 
La/{e and Clark v. Proprietors from the 
Plymouth Colony (1757), 4 (Amer. Antiq. 
Soc). 
196 See infra, p. 328 et seq.