further that the charter prescribed no form of procedure in relation to appeals 
and that no particular direction had been given by act of Parliament or by 
Order in Council; and finally that it was never understood that the King 
in Council undertook the trouble of the trial of land titles, the subject matter 
of most actions in the colony. 175 Although, as we shall see, Winthrop was successful 
in his appeal, 176 the Privy Council glossed over the charges made 
against Connecticut. Years later, in 1764, Governor Fitch stated that complaints 
by way of appeal against judicial determinations of the Assembly 
were not desirable and that they were sometimes troublesome to the colony, 
but in no way endangered it. 177 Connecticut litigants, however, in the last 
years of the colony regarded an appeal to the King in Council as a matter of 
course. 178 
The later career of Rhode Island diverged greatly from that of Connecticut, 
for, as we shall see, the former developed into a prolific source of conciliar 
appeals. 179 Yet even here some traces of resistance remained. For reasons which 
are not made explicit, but probably rest upon statutory basis, appeals were 
denied in cases of pleas in bar and pleas in abatement. 180 One ground of com- 
answer. Cf. the instructions to Jonathan Belcher 
(1 Talcott Papers, 4 Conn. Hist. Soc. Coll., 
155-56). 
175 The answer (see PC 1/48) states that only 
some general conciliar regulation of appeals 
was known "whence there is no direction 
either by whom, when or in what cases appeals 
should be granted, nor whether execution 
should be stayed or what bonds should be 
taken." This is probably a reference to the 
earlier declaration of an inherent right to hear 
appeals from Connecticut despite the charter 
(see supra, p. 144). It was further answered 
that: "All that I have understood by the word 
'appeal' in the common law is a complaint, 
and that in the ecclesiastical courts only is the 
word in use in England as it is here improved 
for the removal of the whole cause to a higher 
tribunal; and I never understood that his 
Majesty in Council ever took the trouble of 
the trial of titles of land, and many of the 
actions here are conversant about nothing 
else" (Article #27). Cf. the Belcher instructions, 
where it is stated that there is no mention 
of appeals and regulations thereof in the 
Connecticut charter as in Massachusetts (1 
Talcott Papers, 156-57). 
176 See infra, pp. 550-51. 
177 "As to those complaints which come against 
the determinations of the Assembly in cases 
between man and man to the King in Council 
in a way which they call appeals (for from our 
courts no appeal is allowed) tho they are 
not desirable and sometimes troublesome to 
the colony yet I should think they can no 
ways endanger it as there is no court but 
may err, and to complain to a higher authority 
for an emendation or correction of 
such error never supposed the court below to 
stand in a criminal light unless corruption 
or male administration is charged and maintained" 
(2 Fitch Papers, 18 Conn. Hist. Soc. 
Coll., 306). Compare the statement of Schlesinger, 
28 Pol. Science Quart., 296. 
178 In discussing a possible unfavorable report 
by some commissioners, one litigant declared, 
"I will positively appeal immediately 
to the King and Council." Ralph Isaacs to 
Jared Ingersoll, May 25, 1770 {Ingersoll MSS). 
Another litigant reminded Ingersoll of a 
promise to help him "in New England and 
Old if I met with any furfther] trouble." 
Elihu Chesebrough to Ingersoll, Feb. 24, 1768 
{ibid.). 
179 The rationale of this development offered 
by Schlesinger (28 Pol. Science Quart., 290) 
appears specious. 
180 See McSparran v. Hazzard, a plea in bar 
sustained and an appeal refused (MS R.I. Sup. 
Ct. fud. Judgment Book., 1725-41, 527); 
Colman v. Brenton, an appeal to the General 
Assembly was refused because "by the law of