similar terms, added the further declaration of policy "that in all such cases 
the Governor and Company of the colony of Rhode Island do take notice that 
it is the inherent right of his Majesty to receive and determine appeals from 
all his Majesty's colonies in America." 52 These dual enunciations made some 
contribution toward the destruction of judicial immunity in chartered colonies, 
but the struggle was not concluded thus easily. 53 
The deterrent effect of the above conciliar mandate upon the independent 
officials of Connecticut was short-lived. For in December, 1700, a petition was 
presented by Nicholas Hallam complaining of the refusal of an appeal to the 
King in Council from a judgment of the Court of Assistants. 54 Petitioner 
Hallam alleged that Governor Winthrop had publicly declared that no appeals 
should be allowed to the King in Council and that before any were allowed 
the colony would dispute the point with the King. 55 This declaration was 
allegedly made despite application for benefit of the March 9, 1698/9, Order 
in Council, mentioned above. 
in the case of the said Francis Brinley, as in 
all others, be transmitted hither in order to a 
final hearing and determination thereof." 
52 CSP, Col., 1699, #299. The Board of Trade 
representation in this cause was based upon the 
Hallams' precedent in Connecticut; see CSP, 
Col., 1699, #286. There had been a previous 
petition in July, 1698, for leave to appeal from 
a Rhode fsland judgment (Peirce v. Willie, PC 
2/77/205). The Committee to which the petition 
was referred forwarded it to the Attorney 
General to inspect the charter of the colony 
and report his opinion as to what might be 
done to afford relief (PC 2/77/223). This 
procedure is obviously indicative of doubts 
whether an appeal lay from the Rhode Island 
courts in the absence of any charter reservation. 
53 Governor Cranston of Rhode Island, on receipt 
of this order forwarded by the Board of 
Trade (CSP, Col., 1699, #341), characterized 
the petitionary allegations of Brinley as 
groundless, denying that Brinley had ever desired 
an appeal of the government or that anybody 
else had ever been refused an appeal to 
the King. But Cranston went on to assert drat 
it would be greatly prejudicial to poor subjects 
in small actions like this, not exceeding 
to be liable to an appeal. He also inquired for 
what value appeals should be granted (ibid., 
#672). 
M PC 2/78/109. The Hallams, as their 
mother's executors, brought action against 
Winthrop and Palmes to show cause why the 
will of John Liveen should not be set aside on 
the ground that the maker was non compos 
mentis. The County Court, on September 19, 
1699, left plaintiffs to proceed in the matter 
in the Prerogative Court if they saw cause. An 
appeal to the Court of Assistants, being moved, 
was granted (MS Conn. Archives, 1 Misc., 
#120). The Court of Assistants, apprehending 
the cause most proper for the Prerogative 
Court, on October 5 referred it thither for a 
hearing with liberty of appeal {ibid., #122). 
The Prerogative Court, on November 2, adjudged 
what was offered insufficient to set 
aside the will and granted an appeal (ibid., 
#124). At a May, 1700, Court of Assistants, 
four reasons were offered for setting aside the 
will, viz., improper constitutions of the County 
Court of probate, the non compos mentis condition 
of Liveen at the making of the will, the 
application of the Statute of Mortmain to the 
ministry bequest, and imposition on the testator 
by one Daniel Taylor (ibid., #125). But 
they were offered in vain (ibid., #126). Cf. 5 
Winthrop Papers, 3 Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll. (6th 
ser.), 83-85, for the reasons advanced for 
nullity. With this statement of the cause compare 
the unfounded assertion of Andrews (4 
Colonial Period, 232, note) that "the famous 
Hallam case was one of seamen's wages." 
55 CSP, Col., 1699, #120; ibid., 1700, #974.