time necessary to obtain such judgments, as delay is a factor capable of vitiating 
appellate review. Effective conciliar jurisdiction was handicapped by two 
elements beyond its control—the distance of the courts appealed from and the 
limited available transportation. The times necessary effectually to prosecute 
an appeal varied widely. From the date of the judgment or decree appealed 
from to the final Order in Council, the time varied from approximately six 
months 37 ° to seven years. 371 In those cases in which this period can be estimated, 
the average was slightly more than two years. 372 But the course of 
Witham v. Gray indicates that a recalcitrant litigant could unconscionably 
delay conciliar determination. 373 The frequency with which appeals failed 
of prosecution is symptomatic of conciliar deficiency. 
In conclusion, it may be remarked that the real significance of this period 
of the Committee of Trade and Foreign Plantations lay in what was accomplished 
toward the establishment of a basis for the system of appellate review 
of the next century. Few of the appeals determined by this Committee were 
of importance to any but the individual litigants. Probably appellate review 
of fine impositions and the sanctions established thereby were the most valuable 
contributions of the Committee and the Privy Council of this period. The 
attempted settlement of the Mason land claims in New Hampshire, while of 
concern to many, did not meet with success. 
370 j n Ward v. Palmer, a New York appeal 
from an October 1-3, 1679, judgment, the 
final Order in Council issued March 9, 
1679/80 (PC 2/68/371, 425). 
371 On July 8, 1688, the appeal of Witham 
v. Gray from a February 17, 1684/5, judgment 
of the Barbados Governor and Council 
was referred to the Committee to hear if they 
saw cause (PC 2/72/705). On July 19 the 
Committee fixed upon February next for the 
hearing (CSP, Col, 1685-88, #1839). On 
September 13, 1689, respondent moving for 
an early hearing, the cause was ordered heard 
on September rB, but appellant was not ready. 
On November n the cause was ordered heard 
November 15, but Sir John Witham was in 
extremis, and no action was taken (CSP, Col., 
i6Bg-g2, #420, 421, 543). On January 14, 
1689/90, respondent moved for dismissal of 
the appeal (ibid., #717), and the Committee 
ordered that notice be given Witham's executors 
to prosecute the appeal within fourteen 
days or show cause why it should not 
be dismissed (ibid., #726). On January 31 
the executors petitioned for further time to 
prepare their case (ibid., #751). On February 
23, 1690/1, upon petition of respondent 
the executors were again given fourteen days 
to prosecute the appeal or in default thereof 
have it dismissed (ibid., #1330, 1334, 1335)- 
On March 10 the appellants petitioned for 
further time to collect evidence in Barbados 
and for leave to obtain copies of documents 
(ibid., #1354). Again respondent petitioned 
for dismissal, and the Committee resolved on 
April 30, 1691, to dismiss the appeal if not 
prosecuted upon the arrival of the next West 
Indian fleet (ibid., #1442, 1443). On January 
10, 1691/2, upon a petition of respondent 
for dismissal of the appeal or a peremptory 
day for hearing thereof, it was ordered that 
the appeal be heard on January 18 (ibid., 
#2003-4). On January 18 the parties attended, 
and the Committee decided to recommend 
the reversal of the judgment appealed from 
(PC 2/74/313). This cause is unusual in that 
one would expect delay from respondent, 
rather than from appellant. 
372 Nineteen appeals furnish this average. 
373 See supra, n. 371.