his claims. 280 With the death of Mason in September, 1688, the contest abated 
for a decade until reopened by Samuel Allen, who obtained by purchase from 
the heirs the Masonian rights. 291 The further course of the land-title struggle 
in New Hampshire as reflected in the judicial function of the Council will be 
considered later. 
INTERCOLONIAL BOUNDARY DISPUTES 
We have stated above that the appellate jurisdiction of the Council at this 
period included an appeal from the judgment of royal commissioners in an 
interproprietary boundary dispute. 292 As we have seen, none of the royal 
charters made provision for royal settlement of boundary controversies with 
contiguous patentees, except that of Rhode Island. This colony's charter provided 
that in all matters of public controversy between Rhode Island and 
the other New England colonies it was to be lawful for the Governor and 
Company of Rhode Island to make their appeals to the King for redress. 293 
But it has been generally asserted that the King exercised original jurisdiction 
in boundary controversies of royal patentees upon principles of feudal sovereignty 
294 Jurisdiction over these intercolonial controversies by royal commis- 
Prov. N.H., 476). It appeared that appellant 
had not offered to agree with Mason or approached 
Cranfield in the matter, and appellant 
did not offer anything whereby it 
might appear that he had any title to the 
lands in dispute {CO 391/6/27). As far as 
the appeal was based on any record made below, 
it could scarcely have adjudicated the 
merits of the question, since no evidence was 
adduced by defendant in the lower court (1 
Doc. and Rec. Rel. Pro'v. N.H., 504, 514-15, 
note). But from the tenor of the communication 
from the Committee to Cranfield it would 
appear that a de novo hearing before the 
Committee was contemplated on evidence 
taken following die terms of such communication; 
see supra, p. 119. 
290 When Mason returned to New England in 
May, 1687, he found the Dominion government 
unkindly disposed toward his claims 
and the judiciary delaying executions on 
judgments previously secured {Captain John 
Mason [Prince Soc. Pub., 1687; ed. J. W. 
Dean], 123). For earlier, on February 24, 
1686/7, Andros had declared that no trial for 
the title of land should be had until the royal 
pleasure was obtained {Andros Records, 13 
Am. Antiq. Soc. Proc. [n.s.], 253). But when 
the Order in Council was produced before the 
Andros Council on July 28, 1687, it was 
ordered that the judges of the Superior Court 
cause the said judgment to be forthwith executed 
accordingly (128 MS Mass. Arc/lives 
[Usurpation, 1687], 136). Andros was later 
petitioned by sundry New Hampshire inhabitants 
that executions had been issued on 
many judgments obtained by Mason against 
petitioners contrary to the royal instructions. 
No writs of scire facias had been used in accordance 
with a June 10, 1686, order of the 
President and Council (presumably meant is 
a May 29 order, see Dudley Records, 236), 
so that reasons for arrest of judgment could 
not be shown. A supersedeas to these writs of 
execution was prayed so that a fair trial to 
the lands might be had (128 MS Mass. 
Archives [Usurpation, 1687], 290). But Mason 
obtained a writ of certiorari on July 13, 1688, 
from Joseph Dudley, the chief justice of the 
Dominion, to remove the causes in which 
judgment had been given to the Superior 
Court of Pleas (2 Doc. and Rec. Rel. Prov. 
N.H., 533-34). However, before any benefit 
could be obtained from this writ, Mason died 
{Captain John Mason, 123). See also Sanborn, 
loc. cit., 229; 4 Edward Randolph, 217, 227. 
28i p r y ; o p_ c if t 220-21. 
292 See supra, p. 73. 
293 6 Thorpe, op. cit., 3221. 
294 1 Blackstone, Commentaries, 231. This al-