a well-defined standard of English practice was lacking, since the appellate 
jurisdiction of the House of Lords in equity was immature. 234 In the field 
of admiralty jurisdiction we find the same latitude in what was taken under 
review, 235 but here the conflict with established civil law procedure was not 
as conspicuous. 236 
In spite of the fact that in many particulars Committee procedure was sui 
generis, some slight disposition to conform with common law standards may 
be detected. In Sharpe v. Dun, a 1695 appeal from a judgment of the Barbados 
Governor and Council affirming the Court of Common Pleas, respondent 
counsel in the hearing before the Committee urged that certain Barbados acts 
dence (CO 391/6/38-40). The other chancery 
appeals give no inkling of the admission 
of evidence dehors the record. 
234 See Macqueen, A Practical Treatise on the 
Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords 
and Privy Council, 70 et seq.; 1 Holdsworth, 
HEL, 372-75. By a July 13, 1678, standing 
order of the House of Lords all chancery appeals 
were to be presented within fourteen 
days after the first day of every session or 
meeting of Parliament after a recess. If the 
decree was made while Parliament was sitting, 
the petition might be presented within fourteen 
days after the decree was made and entered 
(13 /. H. of L., 286). On December 10, 1678, 
it was ordered that in all cases of appeal from 
the courts of Westminster Hall appellant was 
to give sufficient security in the court below 
for the performance of the decree or judgment 
appealed from in case of affirmance. 
From the time of the giving such security, all 
proceedings below were to cease (ibid., 411). 
But by a November 20, 1680, order appellant, 
in the above appellate cases, before answer 
was to give security to the Clerk of Parliament 
by recognizance to the crown in the sum of 
£ 100 to pay such costs to respondent as the 
court should appoint in case of affirmance. The 
earlier 1678 order was repealed (ibid., 680). 
At this period, House of Lords practice permitted 
viva voce examination of witnesses thus 
examined in Chancery (Macqueen, op cit., 
172-73). Witnesses not so examined below 
were excluded from appellate introduction. 
See Needier v. Kendall (Finch's Rep. 468-69). 
A more complete report is in Singleton MS, 
9/27. In comparing these regulations with 
those contained in the instructions and commissions 
it should be borne in mind that there 
is some question whether the latter regulations 
extended to chancery appeals; see supra, pp. 
87-88. 
235 In Minghara v. Martin (Jam.) the Committee 
reported that it had heard counsel for 
the parties and "such evidence as they would 
produce," and, having considered the same, 
were of opinion that the condemnation was 
not warranted by the proofs in the cause (PC 
2/68/267; cf. CO 391/3/257-59). At least 
one appeal indicates belief that new evidence 
could be introduced at the Council Board; see 
St. Loe v. Kirwan, where the appeal seems to 
have been taken from the judgment below 
"in regard the same was obtained because the 
persons summoned at the triall to evidence for 
his Majestie did not appeare" (PC 2/72/476). 
There is also evidence that the record made 
below was not considered sufficient upon appeal; 
see petition of Capt. St. Loe complaining 
of molestation for performance of his duty in 
seizing ships engaged in illegal trading and 
praying indemnification, as he could not produce 
the same evidence in England as in the 
West Indies (PC 2/72/458). For a specimen 
vice-admiralty court record of this period see 
CO 1/59/51- 
236 \y e nave seen above that it is questionable 
whether the provisions of gubernatorial instructions 
and commissions as to appeals extended 
to vice-admiralty appeals. Assuming 
the extension, let us compare civil law regulations 
with the instructional regulations. At 
civil law no minimum was required (Clerke, 
Praxis curiae admiralitatis Angliae [1722] 75, 
79). Ten days were allowed in which to interpose 
an appeal (ibid., 75; 2 Browne, Compendious 
View of the Civil Law [1802], 436). 
Bail had to be given by appellant to abide 
the decree of the appellate court, to pay costs, 
and to confirm the acts of his proctor (Clerke, 
op. cit., 83). New evidence could apparently 
be adduced upon appeal (Clerke, op cit., 83; 
Clerke, Praxis ecclesiastica [1684], 335), but 
cf. 2 Browne, op. cit., 437, note 50.