hearings de novo 225 and had no counterpart in English writ of error proceedings.226 Coming now to the province of the criminal appeal, it must be cautioned that although called "appeals," some were rather in the nature of fine remissions by royal clemency. 227 There was little adherence to English writ of error practice in these cases. By the common law rules of this period, writs of error in criminal causes were granted defendants only by royal grace. 228 Most, but not all, of the criminal appeals before the Committee met this requirement. 229 On the other hand, at common law use of the bill of exceptions was not allowed in such cases, 230 whereas in Committee practice both appellants and the crown were afforded virtually unlimited opportunity to take further evidence after admission of appeals. 231 The rationale of such practice, as we have 225 j n Ward v. Palmer (N.Y.) the issue was whether a payment made by respondent to appellant was in part payment of the bond sued on or on another separate and distinct debt. Letters written by respondent after the proceedings below confessing the principal debt as still due were read at the hearing. For further proof, divers witnesses deposed diat the money was paid in satisfaction of a distinct debt arising from another transaction (CO 39i/3/Mi-43> 144-48; CO 1/44/37; cf. CO 1/44/39 VII; CSP, Col, 1677-80, #1316 V, VI). In Sharpe v. Dun (Barb.) William Brook and Sir Thomas Momperson were examined by the Committee as to the factual allegations in the case (CO 391/8/71-74). But note that this appeal was not determined by the Committee, but by the Council Board (PC 2/76/ 164, 168). The scope of the hearing also appears indirectly. In Bland v. Codd (Va.) the parties, encountering difficulty in bringing their proofs and witnesses to England, agreed to refer the matter to local arbitration (CO 391/ 5/104). In Witham v. Gray (Barb.) the executors of appellant petitioned for further time to collect evidence in Barbados (CSP, Col., 1689-92, #1354). We have already seen the orders which issued in several causes upon admission of appeals for the taking of evidence below (supra, n. 223). For the latitude given appellant in Vaughan v. Mason to prove his title at the Committee hearing see CO 391/ 6/27-29. 226 These appeals were not in the nature of writs of error coram nobis for errors in fact. The factual errors were not limited to those facts which would affect the validity and regularity of the proceedings below; see Stephen, Treatise on the Principles of Pleading (3d ed., 1835), 118-19. Compare as to common law practice, Holt, C. T. in Knoll's Case (3 Sal\. 145), that it "is beneath the dignity of the House of Peers (that being the supreme judicature) to try matters of fact." 227 See Goldringham and Lane v. Rex (PC 2/71/222; CO 391/5/239, 248); Witham v. Rex (CO 391/5/222). 228 Crawle v. Crawle (1 Vern. 170); The Rioters' Case (ibid., 175); cf. 1 Eq. Cas. Ab. 414. This stand was not modified until 1705 when in Regina v. Paty et al. (2 Sal\. 504), ten judges of King's Bench "were of opinion, that the Queen could not deny the writ of error, but it was grantable ex debito justitiae, except only in treason or felony." 229 In Goldringham and Lane v. Rex no preliminary application was made for leave to appeal from Barbados fine impositions (PC 2/71/174)- 230 Coke, Second Institute, 426; 1 Stephen, History of the Criminal haw of England (1883), 309, 373. 231 In Hanson v. Rex, an appeal from a fine imposed by the Barbados Court of Grand Sessions in April, 1681 (CSP, Col., 1681-85, #469; cf. ibid., #915), the Committee heard the parties (ibid., #1290, 1301, 1341, 1352) and considered various depositions and interrogatories (CO i/si/#95, 97; CO 1/52/ #90) as well as the proceedings appealed from and documents relating thereto (CSP, Col., 1681-85, #79i I-XVI). Upon this examination the Committee advised and it was ordered that the sentence was irregular, but that the charge was so serious that it should receive Committee re-examination and that five