in some instances, but this procedure is anomalous. 212 For the most part appeals 
were heard in one day 213 and in the regular course of Committee routine. 

Owing to the vagaries of infant provincial jurisprudence, all the appeals 
coming before the Committee could not be decided from the law reports and 
statute books alone. Witnesses might be called before the Committee in the 
course of a hearing to discover the norm of judicial practice in the court below 
214 Further, testimony might be heard as to whether such norm was 
violated in the case at bar. 215 The Attorney General might be consulted by 
the Committee when doubts arose on a question of law. 216 But for the most 
part the Committee arrived at its own conclusions upon arguments of counsel 
as to the law applicable in a given appeal. 217 
Coming now to the question of the scope of Committee appellate hearings, 
we must remember that the Committee reviewed the judgments of common 
law courts, the decrees of chancery courts, and the sentences of admiralty 
courts, and both civil and criminal matters. Therefore, it is necessary to examine 
each jurisdictional branch separately in determining the scope and 
nature of the review powers exercised. Considering first the common law 
jurisdiction, can these "appeals" be considered in the nature of writs of 
error? 218 Several distinctions are immediately patent from the commission 
and instructional regulation of conciliar appeals. Under English writ of error 
212 In Witham v. Rex an answer was ordered 
to the petition of appeal and a replication to 
the answer (CO 391/5/197, 202; CSP, Col., 
1685-88, #414, 429, 430). An answer by 
respondent to the petition and appeal is indicated 
in a few other instances; see Bland v. 
Codd {PC 2/70/242; CSP, Col., 1681-85, 
#1887); Scott v. Dyer (CO 391/6/27). 
213 Cf. Sharpe v. Dun (CSP, Col, i6 93 - 9 6, 
1977) where hearings took place on 
two different days before it was recommended 
that the Council hear die appeal. A cause 
might be heard on one day and the report 
thereon drawn up on another; see Raynesford 
v. Gorges (CSP, Col, 1685-88, #1520, 1540). 
At times more than one appeal was heard at 
a single meeting; see CO 391/6/38 (three 
William Vaughan appeals). 
214 In Hanson v. Rex five persons were sworn 
and gave testimony as to die usual practice at 
the Barbados Grand Sessions in the imposition 
of fines (CSP, Col., 1681-85, #1290). 
215 Two persons were sworn in Hanson v. 
Rex who testified that no paper was sent 
around at the Barbados Grand Sessions to 
ascertain the amount of the fine to be imposed 
on Hanson —a seeming departure from 
local practice {ibid., #1301). 
216 In Hanson v. Rex the Attorney General 
was ordered to consider an Act for holding 
Grand Sessions in Barbados, and to report as 
to the Governor's power to fine without the 
concurrence of the Council (ibid., $1290). 
217 Appellant in Hanson v. Rex, either ignorant 
or distrustful of the usual procedure, 
petitioned that his case be referred to "the 
Judges of the Common Law and the Court 
of Admiralty" (ibid., #1040 I). 
218 The lower phase of the judicial hierarchy 
apparently contemplated writ of error proceedings 
by the respective governors and councils, 
for the normal instructions directed appeals 
thereto "in cases of error" (1 Labaree, Royal 
Instructions, #442, 445, 448). But note the 
omission of this phrase in the Bermuda instructions 
from 1690 to 1702 (ibid., #445). 
For the presence of this phrase in commissions 
see 3 Doc. Rel. Col. Hist. N.Y., 379, 539, 625, 
829; cf. the argument in Dutton v. Howell, 
Shower, P.C. 24, 33, and the mention of the 
sending a writ of error to Jamaica in the case 
of one Allingham (CSP, Dom., 1679-80, 567).