in Council, the former provision was also retained. 189 The operative effect 
of such retention would seemingly be to prevent any decrease in the amount of 
security necessary upon appeal. For obviously the amount of security necessary 
to cover costs and damages alone would be less than for costs and damages 
plus the amount of the condemnation. In the large proportion of cases admitted 
upon application to the Council, it might be assumed that the question of suspension 
of execution was moot. Still, there are instances in which appeals were 
admitted with advice that execution was not to be suspended because of such 
admission. 190 More surprising, in other cases all proceedings below were 
ordered suspended upon admission of appeals. 191 Apparently the issuance of 
such order depended upon making out a prima facie case of erroneous or oppressive 
conduct below. The instructional phrase "effectually prosecute" was 
capable of various meanings in the bonds furnished upon appeal, but the 
Council interpreted it to mean presentation of the appeal within a year. 192 
At this point we must consider the procedure used to bring an appeal on to 
a hearing before the Committee. In some cases when the Council admitted 
an appeal, it would set the date for the hearing at the time of admission. 193 
Or after reference of an appeal to it, the Committee might of its own initiative 
read the appeal and set a day for the hearing. 194 The respondent could expedite 
the hearing by a petition to the Council Board or the Committee that 
a short day be appointed for a hearing. 195 The Lords Committee would then 
appoint a day and give the parties notice. 196 If appellant failed to appear after 
being given adequate opportunity, the Lords Committee would recommend 
dismissal without a hearing. 197 
189 Ibid., #445- 
190 Elletson v. Daniell (PC 2/74/274). 
191 Billop v. West (3 Doc. Rel. Col. Hist. N.Y., 
367); Witham v. Rex (CO 391/5/115; CSP, 
Col, 1685-88, #95); cf. ibid., #98; Hubbard 
v. Smailes (PC 2/73/424). 
192 See White v. de Castillo (PC 2/75/253). 
193 Raynesford v. Gorges (PC 2/71/280); but 
this appeal was not heard on the specified day 
(PC 2/72/546). 
194 See Wright v. Cornwall (CSP, Col., 
1681-85, $1046); Raynesford v. Gorges 
(CSP, Col, 1685-88, #680); Thornhill v. 
Rex (ibid., #1481). After the appeal was 
read, appellants in the last mentioned case 
were given three months to prosecute the appeal. 

195 See PC 2/70/34, 48; CSP, Col., 1685-88, 
#905; PC 2/68/257 (here the Council Board 
set the date for a hearing before the Committee); 
PC 2/70/242, 247; PC 2/72/476 
(Council Board set date for hearings before 
itself). See also the petition offered by respondent 
upon belief that the appeal was unjustifiable 
(Scott v. Dyer, CSP, Col, 1685-88, 
#i 370). 
W6 CSP, Col, 1685-88, #907; CO 391/4/ 
249, 256. Apparently summonses were notified 
upon the Exchange. 
IST j n Walton v. Walford a petition that a 
short day be appointed for a hearing was 
presented to the Council Board by Thomas 
Wadleigh for the respondents; on August 8, 
1683, it was referred to the Lords Committee 
(PC 2/70/34). On November 13 the petition 
was read by the Committee and the appeal 
ordered heard on December n (CSP, Col, 
1681-85, #1377)- On that date the appeal 
was called, but no appellant appearing, the 
hearing was deferred until January 8, 1683/4 
(ibid., #1448). On the latter date respondents 
attended, but appellant still failed to appear 
(ibid., #1499). On January 22 the Committee 
reported to the Council Board, advising