cedure to make the giving of security by appellant a condition precedent to 
the appeal admission. 184 Failure to give security could thus result in the final 
dismissal of an appeal. ISS In some causes security was ordered given by both 
parties to the appeal. 186 The amount of security varied widely, bearing no 
uniform relation to the amount involved in the appeal. 187 
Under the standing instructions issued during this period there is some confusion 
evident in the matter of suspension of execution upon appeal to England. 
Earlier instructions seemingly contemplated suspension of execution 
upon appeal in the provision that security should be given by appellant that 
he would effectually prosecute the appeal and "answer the condemnation, as 
also pay such costs and damages as shall be awarded by us." 188 Apparently 
by the word "condemnation," borrowed from the civil law, was meant the 
award of the judgment appealed from. Accordingly, if execution were not 
suspended, there would seem little reason for posting security to "answer the 
condemnation." Yet in some instances when a specific provision was inserted 
that execution was not to be suspended by reason of any appeal to the King 
184 See inter alia Billop v. West (3 Doc. Rel. 
Col. Hist. N.Y., 367); Raynesford v. Gorges 
(PC 2/71/280); Cooke v. St. Loe (PC 2/71/ 
330); Knight v. Hallett (PC 2/72/666). In 
all these causes security was presumably given 
the Council Clerk; see Bland v. Codd (PC 
2/69/684). In Hubbard v. Smailes (PC 2/ 
73/4 2 4) appellant was allowed to give security 
in Bermuda. In Bland v. Codd security was 
first ordered given in Virginia, but it was 
petitioned that because of respondent's influence, 
appellant could not raise security there. 
It was thereupon ordered that the clerk of 
the Council take good and sufficient security 
instead (PC 2/69/541, 684). But in some 
cases no security is mentioned; see Thayre v. 
Savage (PC 2/69/643); Sharpe v. Dun (PC 
2/76/147); the various Edward Randolph appeals 
(PC 2/69/343). There is no mention of 
security in the order admitting several appeals 
of William Vaughan (PC 2/71/65), but see 
Robert Mason's allegation (CSP, Col., 1685-88, 
#1002). 
185 In Hubbard v. Smailes an Order in Council 
admitted an appeal from Bermuda provided 
security was given to Governor Richier, within 
a month of the arrival of the appellant in that 
island, to prosecute the appeal before the 
Board within six months after such security 
had been given, wind and weather permitting. 
Upon the giving of such security the governor 
was to halt all proceedings on the verdict 
and transmit authentic copies of all proceed- 
ings in the cause to the Board; if no security 
were given, the appeal was to be dismissed 
(PC 2/73/424). A later order founded on a 
petition of respondent directed the governor 
that if security had not been given by the time 
the order reached him the appeal was to be 
finally dismissed and execution awarded without 
delay (PC 2/74/244). 
186 Bland v. Codd (PC 2/69/541); St. Loe 
v. Kirwan (PC 2/72/468); Elletson v. Daniell 
(PC 2/74/274); see also Richier v. Goddard, 
where it was petitioned by appellant that respondents 
be also compelled to give security 
for costs and damages (CSP, Col., 1693-96, 
#2196). 
187 The amounts ranged from £200 in Walton 
v. Walford (CO 1/51/71 II); Wright v. Cornwall 
(CO 1/51/102 I); and Hubbard v. 
Smailes (CO 37/i/#34 [p- 8]), to £12,000 
in Witham v. Rex (CSP, Col., 1685-88, 
#203). Some intermediate sums were £400 
(PC 2/69/268), £500 (PC 2/75/50), 
£ 1,000 (PC 2/71/330), £2,000 (CSP, Col, 
'693-96, #2209; PC 2/71/181). In the appeals 
of Jahleel Brenton, £1,100 security was 
given below, but an Order in Council commanded 
the colonial authorities to take sufficient 
security, not exceeding £11,000, to 
prosecute the appeal and answer any determination 
therein (2 APC, Col., #480). But cf. 
the terms of the 1691 Massachusetts Bay 
charter, supra, p. 76. 
188 1 Labaree, Royal Instructions, #444.