in a realistic mood recognized their inability to exert pressure on recalcitrant 
colonial courts or officials, at least by means of any appellate process. 178 
Let us now trace the appellate course from the granting of the appeal to the 
determining Order in Council, When conciliar appeals were made, it was 
usual during the period for appellants to give security to answer the award 
in case of affirmance, or to prosecute the appeal with effect, or both. 179 As we 
have seen, the giving of security below was made mandatory by the various 
commissions and instructions issued to colonial executives. 180 But even prior 
to these expressions of imperial policy such practice existed in some colonies. 181 
This practice was also afforced by colonial statutory provisions. lB2 And as 
we have already seen, these various requirements were supplemented by a 
February, 1683/4, conciliar order that no plantation appeals should be admitted 
at the Council Board unless sufficient security were first given by appellants 
as well at the Board as in their respective plantations to prosecute their appeals 
with effect and to stand the conciliar award. 183 Thus, where an appeal 
was admitted in the first instance by the Privy Council it was the normal pro- 
2/75/295; CSP, Col., 1693-96, #726). In 
August, 1695, it was still necessary to issue an 
Order in Council that there be no obstructions 
to the bringing of the appeal (PC 2/76/179). 
See also the recalcitrant attitude of Bermuda 
Governor Goddard in his controversy with 
Isaac Richier (CSP, Col., 1693-96, 
1887; PC 2/76/95; cf. CSP, Col, 1696-97, 
#118, 728). After the Committee of Trade 
and Plantations had ceased to function, Goddard 
was recalled as governor, and it was 
ordered that any new governor be instructed to 
let Richier appeal from all prosecutions (PC 
2/77/12). 
178 In Thayre v. Savage appellant alleged the 
ancient purchase of land in Braintree, New 
England, from an Indian sachem; that Massachusetts 
Bay had recently extended its jurisdiction 
to include Braintree and disposed of 
petitioner's land to Captains Savage and Clapp. 
Appellant was compelled to defend title at 
Boston, where the court refused to admit appellant's 
Indian deed and an appeal to the 
King in Council. Appellant then came to England 
to appeal in person, but was dissuaded 
therefrom by the Massachusetts Bay agents on 
assurance of local justice. Upon return, appellant 
received no recognition of his claims, 
and ruin ensued (CSP, Col., 1681-85, #834). 
Cf. the answer of the Massachusetts Bay agents 
(ibid., #931). Upon report of the Committee 
the appeal was ordered heard before the King 
in Council (ibid., #989). When an attempt 
was made in the colony to secure the fulfillment 
of terms in the admitting conciliar order 
for sending over a copy of the Indian deed and 
for giving respondents notice, the order was 
rudely rejected and the King's authority contemptuously 
scorned {ibid., #1130, 1620). 
Upon consideration of this action the Committee 
was of the opinion that petitioner 
would have to attend the issue of the quo 
warranto against the charter of Massachusetts 
Bay (ibid., #1621, 1627). 
179 As to security requirements of prosecution 
within a limited period, geography might 
be recognized by exceptions covering danger 
of the seas and the restraint of princes; see 
CO 5/1305/61 I; CO 37/i/34 (8). 
180 See supra, pp. 80-84. The 1691 charter to 
Massachusetts Bay also contained security provisions, 
supra, p. 76. 
181 In New York security was given in the 
cases of Ward v. Palmer (PC 2/68/371; CSP, 
Col., 1677-80, #1316 IV); Darvall v. Hall 
(PC 2/69/268), and Wright v. Cornwall 
(CSP, Col., 1681-85, #1056) before any commission 
issued necessitating security. 
182 See supra, pp. 84-87. 
183 See supra, p. 87. This order was the byproduct 
of the dismissal of two New Hampshire 
appeals for nonprosecution; see CO 391/ 
4/252, 258. But this Order in Council appears 
to have been sent only to the colonies of New 
Hampshire and Virginia (CO 391/4/331, 
337)-