no executive power; its decisions gained force only from the orders of the 
Council Board. 
The course of an appeal before the Council and the Committee depended in 
the first instance upon whether an appeal had been granted below. In the 
eighteenth century, when the conciliar appellate system had become firmly 
established, it was seldom necessary to make a preliminary petition to the 
King in Council for leave to appeal. But in the seventeenth century, when 
practice was undeveloped and the right to appeal not generally understood or 
accepted, it was often necessary to present such a preliminary petition. 153 In 
case an appeal had been granted below, the initial procedural step was presentation 
of the petition and appeal to the King in Council. This petition and appeal 
normally gave a succinct statement of the cause of action and of the proceedings 
of colonial judiciaries thereon, alleged that good security had been 
given below, and prayed conciliar hearing and reversal. 154 After being read, 
the petition and appeal was then referred by the Council Board to the Committee 
to examine and report how they found the same with their opinion 
thereon. 155 After hearing and examining the appeal, the Committee reported 
to the Board its advice in the matter. This report would then be 
adopted by the Council in the order which issued in final settlement of the 
cause. 158 
If we venture to call this the procedural norm in colonial appeals at this 
period a host of variations must be enumerated. In some cases the Privy 
Council itself entered upon the hearing of an appeal, then without definitive 
order therein referred the cause to the Committee to hear and report. 157 The 
procedural possibility also existed that following a Committee report the 
parties would be heard by counsel at the Board before an Order in Council 
issued. 158 In some causes the Committee merely decided upon reference 
153 More than one-third of the appeals during 
this period were granted upon application to 
the Council. This proportion is greatly increased 
if fourteen appeals of Edward Randolph 
are included, but it is not certain that 
these appeals were granted by the Council; see 
PC 2/69/343. It is not to be taken that in each 
case of conciliar admission an appeal had been 
denied below. 
154 See as an example the petition and appeal 
of William Vaughan, 1685, from four New 
Hampshire judgments, sentences, and decrees 
(Samuel Allen MSS). 
155 Compare Witham v. Gray, a 1688 Barbados 
appeal from a February 17, 1684/5 judgment 
of the Governor and Council, where the reference 
to the Committee was to consider, to hear 
the appeal if they saw cause, and to report 
thereon. This reference variation may have 
been due to the lapse of time before the appeal 
was presented and referred (2 APC, Col., 
#265). 
156 For an example of conciliar appellate procedure 
in most rudimentary form see Ward v. 
Palmer, PC 2/68/371, 425; CSP, Col, 1677- 
80, #1309, 1314. 
157 Bland v. Codd (Va.) (PC 2/70/255). Before 
the Committee could hear the appeal the 
parties agreed to submit the matter to arbitration. 
Lord Howard was designated as final 
referee if arbitration failed (CSP, Col, 1685- 
88, #36, 49, 216); apparently such arbitration 
did fail (ibid., #756, 781, 782, 817). 
158 Darvall v. Hall (N.Y.) (PC 2/69/268, 421; 
CSP, Col, 1681-85, #235)-