some prominence as a factor to be reckoned with in conciliar procedure. These 
rehearings were granted upon petition to the Council Board after previous 
Committee hearing and report. 147 Upon grant of such rehearing notice was 
provided the adversary parties to appear. 148 Grounds for rehearing included 
allegations of new matter and of previous improper representation. 149 This 
system of rehearing was opposed as tending to prolong unduly appeals from 
the islands; 150 it also brought out the lack of administrative continuity in 
conciliar functioning. 151 The time limitation for the prosecution of appeals 
might also be invoked as an obstacle to a rehearing. 152 
With this brief description of Channel Islands procedure before us, it is 
possible to settle by inference the source of some phases of procedure upon 
colonial appeals. As in the system just considered, two bodies were primarily 
concerned with colonial appeals—the Council Board and the Committee of 
Trade and Plantations. For the most part, the former restricted itself to 
formal action; the majority of the hearings took place before the Committee. 
But with the exception of minor interlocutory orders the Committee possessed 
At the 1676 hearing of Norman v. Bisson, 
Secretary Joseph Williamson questioned 
whether allegations of new matter were proper 
either on appeal or on doleance (SP 47/1/ 
#37). 
147 See Maret v. Dumaresq (PC 2/68/158); 
Priaulx v. Thomes (PC 2/66/234). In some 
cases the petition for a rehearing was referred 
to the Committee, and the decision left to that 
body. Fautrart v. Rolland (PC 2/71/146, 163). 
See also Peryn v. de Carteret (PC 2/71/275) 
where following a rehearing before the Committee 
a further petition for a rehearing was 
proffered to the Council Board. The decision 
of the Council as to granting a rehearing appears 
to have been arrived at ex parte in most 
instances. But cf. Peryn v. de Carteret (PC 
2/71/267) where respondent was ordered to 
return an answer to the Board showing cause 
why a rehearing should not be granted. The 
Order in Council allowing the rehearing might 
suspend the former order in the cause; see 
Priaulx v. Thomes (PC 2/66/234). 
148 Maret v. Dumaresq (supra, a. 147); 
Priaulx v. Thomes (supra, n. 147); Fautrart 
v. Rolland (supra, n. 147). In Peryn v. de 
Carteret (PC 2/69/111) before a summons 
issued for the respondent to attend the Board, 
the appellant was ordered to give sufficient 
security to the clerk of the Council to pay the 
respondent all the costs and charges that he 
would incur in coming over and attending the 
cause, if the rehearing resulted in a confirmation 
of the former order. 
149 Priaulx v. Thomes (supra, n. 147; counsel 
not fully instructed at hearing, new matter to 
offer); Maret v. Dumaresq (supra, n. 147; 
"petitioner hath matter to offer upon which 
he hath not yet been heard"). 
150 The respondent in Peryn v. de Carteret 
(PC 2/69/162) alleged that rehearings would 
introduce a precedent whereby law suits would 
never end and the island inhabitants would be 
utterly ruined through vexatious delays and 
frivolous pretenses. 
151 In Peryn v. de Carteret (PC 2/71/275) 
respondent alleged that appellant, after the 
sentence had been confirmed and when he 
thought the business might be forgotten, had, 
unknown to respondent, presented petitions to 
the Board and obtained references, but upon 
respondent's application they were as often 
dismissed. The third dismissal ordered that 
the King be no further troubled in the matter, 
but this edict did not prevent further application 
to both the Committee and the Board. 
152 In Fautrart v. Rolland (PC 2/71/285) the 
Committee reported that it found no grounds 
to revoke or alter its former judgment, and 
since all appeals ought to be prosecuted widiin 
a year and a day, advised the confirmation of 
the former order in the cause. This regulation 
is alleged inter alia in Peryn v. de Carteret 
(PC 2/71/275) as a reason for not granting 
a rehearing.