summons, appellant petitioned the Council Board for reversal; 134 conversely in case of nonprosecution respondent petitioned for dismissal of the appeal. 135 In the normal procedural course, after respondent entered an appearance, appellant petitioned the Council Board to be heard on his appeal. This petition was then referred to the Committee for Jersey and Guernsey to hear and report thereon. After such Committee hearing and report an Order in Council was issued based upon it. 136 Under this committee system the position formerly held by the legal advisers became minor. 137 The delegation of the appellate function to insular commissioners was no longer accepted practice, 138 although recourse was still had to the island courts for information as to the state of the insular law. 139 v. Bouillon (PC 2/55/366; PC 2/56/96); Renouf v. Gibault (PC 2/58/15, 19); cf. Gosselin v. de Saumarez (PC 2/65/450; PC 2/66/17) where respondent complained that appellant had summoned said respondent to appear before entry of the appeal and without any order for such summons from the Clerk of the Council as was usual in like cases; that petitioner came over to enter an appearance upon such summons and was refused it. The Council awarded respondent costs for loss sustained by such irregular proceedings. By Order in Council, Jersey appeals were to be prosecuted between the beginning of Easter Term and the end of Midsummer Term (supra, pp. 32-33). Therefore, it was conceived necessary that part at least of the forty days to appear fall within the said time limits; see Dumaresq v. Le Hardy (PC 2/60/119, 164). But this temporal limitation for prosecution appears to have been extended to Guernsey also by conciliar usage; see the 1682 summons in Monamy v. Dobree from Guernsey (PC 2/69/436) and the recital in a July 6, 1697, summons (PC 2/77/36). But this regulation was by no means strictly observed. For Jersey violations thereof see PC 2/56/110, 119; PC 2/58/182; PC 2/60/205, 207; PC 2/75/368. For Guernsey, see PC 2/70/199; PC 2/71/124. But cf. Ahier v. Mallet, where when the parties appeared after the usual time for prosecuting appeals had lapsed, the hearing was put off until the next year (PC 2/72/716). 134 De la Cloche v. Le Hardy (PC 2/69/61); Dobree v. le Gentilhomme (PC 2/71/288). The Council at times exhibited a lenient attitude in giving summoned persons time to appear before it; see du Hamel v. de Guidici (PC 2/61/59, 106. 125). 135 Le Montais v. Mauger (PC 2/65/135); de Carteret v. Le Hardy (PC 2/71/285); Richardson v. Le Febrve (PC 2/71/490). 136 p or representative cases see de Jersey v. Bonamy (PC 2/69/584, 674, 675, 679); Nicolle v. Gosselin (PC 2/70/136, 184, 187, 199); Vaudin v. Fautrart (PC 2/70/296; PC 2/71/90, 93, 124, 127); de Carteret v. de Carteret (PC 2/74/33, I 9I> 207, 225, 230); Le Moigne v. Valpy (PC 2/74/216, 389, 407; PC 2/75/151, 157); Seale v. Mauger (PC 2/74/92; PC 2/75/92, 136, 180, 183). But cf. the seeming Committee finality in Journeaux v. Dumaresq (PC 2/71/119, 170) where the reference terms were "to give such order therein, as their Lordships shall thinke fit." As to the general reduction to formality of Council Board functions see 2 Turner, The Privy Council of England, 104, 109. 137 For attendance of the King's Advocate at a Committee hearing see Fiot v. Gosselin (PC 2/69/328). In Briard v. le Brocq the appeal was referred to counsel "to state the cause" (PC 2/70/214). For reference of non-appellate matters to legal advisers see PC 2/73/400; PC 2/74/i94- 138 See the statement of the Attorney General and the Advocate General in Andros v. Priaulx (PC 2/61/272) that "it is not fitt any person should have the liberty to fly from a court first and afterwards to returne thither againe at his pleasure, drawing causes and persons to and fro to their grievance, cost, and vexation, and as to this cause in particular it being legally brought by the said Andros before his Majesty and the Board it ought to receive its determination here, and not to be remitted to the said island." 139 See Gosselin v. de Quitteville (PC 2/69/ 683, PC 2/70/206, 214) where the Committee report advised reversal, if appellant could es-