A related question coming before the Lords Committee was whether plantation council boards possessed original jurisdiction. In June, 1676, one Giles Bland complained of the imposition of a fine by the Virginia Governor and Council for an affront to another court. It was maintained that trial should have been by jury, every Englishman being supposed to carry the benefit of the laws of England with him. The Lords Committee conceived that a council table was invested with many authorities that had in all times been exercised and allowed of, and so ran into prescription, which was even the foundation of the common law. Although the English Council Board was restrained by 16 Charles I, c. 10, yet it was questionable whether that law extended so far as to effect a Virginia council. For in such a remote place it would be difficult to support the government unless there were an extraordinary power in the Board for emergencies. The Lord Privy Seal at first dissented, alleging that the ancient authority appertaining to the English Council could not be properly attributed to a council in Virginia, which was no ancient colony. It was finally advised that the petition be sent to the Governor and Council to answer within six months. 131 It is worth noticing here that when this question of the exercise of original jurisdiction by colonial council boards arose again in the next century, the Privy Council prohibited such exercise, 132 except insofar as the Governor and Council might act as a court of chancery. COMMITTEE PROCEDURE; CHANNEL ISLANDS; PLANTATIONS After this survey of conciliar jurisdiction, we now come to the procedure adopted by the Council Board and the Lords Committee in the exercise thereof. Here, again, it is desirable first to examine the appellate procedure evolved for Jersey and Guernsey by 1679, and during the years following, as a standard available in colonial matters. By 1679, as a matter of procedural chronology, virtually all appeals were first entered in the Council Register. Upon this entry, or shortly thereafter, a conciliar summons issued for respondent to appear and answer within forty days of service. 133 If respondent failed to answer upon due 131 CO 391/1/141-42. 132 See infra, pp. 638-39. 133 The trend was toward summons issuance immediately upon entry; see Crow v. Syvret, appeal entered December 12, 1664 (PC 2/57/ 320), summons issued the following March 13 (PC 2/58/74); de Carteret v. Payne, appeal entered Feb. 26, 1665/6 (PC 2/58/366), summons issued on May 9 (PC 2/59/3); Herault v. Dumaresq, appeal entered on September 1, 1666 (PC 2/59/146), summons issued September 26 (PC 2/59/170); L'Angle v. Le Couteur, appeal entered on April 5, 1673 (PC 2/63/409), summonses dated September 10 and December 12, 1673 (PC 2/64/93, 151); La Cloche v. de Carteret, appeal entered August 2, 1675, summons dated August 6 (PC 2/64/481); Maret v. La Cloche, appeal entered August 2, 1675, summons dated August 9 (PC 2/64/481); Allen v. de Carteret, appeal entered October 21, 1676, summons issued same date (PC 2/65/359); Ahier v. Richardson (PC 2/65/377) and Maret v. Dumaresq to the same effect (PC 2/66/219). In some instances respondents entered an appearance before the appeal was entered. Rozell