company had any right to receive appeals from the insular courts of judicature, 
but the company waived the point for the time. 18 
The complaint that Bermuda inhabitants were barred from the liberty of 
appeals and petitions to the King 19 was heard in October, 1679. The case 
specified (an Assembly complaint of five years earlier) was denied by the 
company. The Lords Committee agreed to report their opinion "that the inhabitants 
ought to have absolute liberty to present their petitions and appeals 
unto his Majesty without any interposition or participation whatsoever." 20 
The charter contained no reservation of appeals to the King, yet all subjects 
inhabiting Bermuda and their progeny were to enjoy all the liberties, franchises, 
and immunities of free denizens and natural subjects to all intents and 
purposes as if they had been abiding and born within England. 21 The right 
to petition the sovereign was a recognized liberty. By coupling "appeal" with 
"petition" the right to review colonial judgments despite lack of saving charter 
provisions was arrived at. Except for the fact that the "petition and appeal" 
terminology employed by the Committee thenceforth was seated in conciliar 
appellate procedure, the case was without future importance, for the problem 
of Bermuda as a chartered colony was ended by quo warranto proceedings in 
Trinity Term, 1684, when the charter was vacated. 22 The matter of appeals 
was not passed on by the court; at least we have seen no decision from the 
courts at Westminster at this period recognizing the right to appeal to the 
King in Council from any plantation courts. 23 ]ennet v. Bishopp 24 is not in 
point, 25 the case of the counties palatine being distinguishable from that of 
dominions of the crown outside the realm. 26 
The ad hoc quality of Committee judicial determination at this time is illustrated 
by the fact that even after the declaration of principle in the Bermuda 
case the difficulties with Massachusetts Bay dragged on, and in 1684 another 
colony, Connecticut, joined the list of renitents. At a General Court held at 
18 CO 391/3/81. The company continued to 
issue instructions as to said appeals to the 
company (2 Lefroy, op. cit., 523). 
19 2 Lefroy, op. cit., 468. The company answered 
that the inhabitants were not forbidden 
to send any public petitions to the King or 
the Company, but private petitions between 
party and party under five pounds were not 
to be sent without approbation (2 ibid., 
471)- 
20 CO 391/3/78-79; 2 Lefroy, op. cit., 477- 
78. Cf. the statement in Coke (Fourth Institute, 
340) that, "forasmuch as an appeal is a natural 
defense, it cannot be taken away by any Prince 
or power." 
21 See 2 Lefroy, op. cit., 94. 
22 Wilkinson, The Adventurers of Bermuda 
(t933)> 368 _ 73; 2 Lefroy, op. cit., 539. 
23 Cf. the enigmatic argument of Sergeant 
Baldwin in Daws v. Pindar (2 Mod. 45). 
24 1 Vernon 184. A manuscript report of the 
case reads: "a bill of appeal was brought in 
this Court [Chancery] from a decree at the 
Grand Sessions in Wales and was disallowed" 
(Singleton MS, 9/50). 
25 But cf. Keith, Constitutional History of the 
First British Empire, 306; Washburne, Imperial 
Control of the Administration of Justice, 56; 
Bentwich, Practice of the Privy Council, 5. 
26 See 1 Hargrave, Collection of Tracts Relating 
to the law of England (1787), 399-404, 
423.