Finally, in April, 1664, a commission was issued by the King to Colonel 
Richard Nicolls, Sir Robert Carr, George Cartwright, and Samuel Maverick 
to exercise wide and varied powers in the several New England colonies. 360 
Under the terms of this general commission a broad power to hear all complaints 
and appeals was bestowed; 361 the exercise of the power in Massachusetts 
Bay was somewhat circumscribed by provisions in another commission 
applying to that colony alone. 302 The commissioners arrived in Boston during 
July, 1664, and acquainted the General Court with the terms of their commission. 
As a result, in the following October an address of the court in strong 
terms was forwarded to the King, complaining of deprivation of power and 
subjection to the will of others. 363 The commissioners, however, following 
the July preliminary, departed the colony to attend to the conquest and pacification 
of New Netherland and then to effect a boundary settlement between 
New York and Connecticut. Upon the return of some of the commissioners 
477 et seq.; cf. i Sewel, History of the Quakers 
(1811), 472-76; 2 Besse, Collection of the 
Sufferings of the People Called Quakers 
(1753), 225-26. 
360 For the character of the personnel see 3 
Osgood, op cit., 171-72; Kaye, op. cit., 81-83; 
10 Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc. (Ist ser.), 381-82. 
Nicolls alone of the four commissioners could 
boast of some legal training (E. A. Jones, 
American Members of the Inns of Court 
[1924], 164). Maverick mentioned the necessity 
of an able lawyer being sent as "there is 
not one in New England that pretends any 
thinge as to the knowledg of the Lawes of 
England" {Clarendon Papers, 36). 
361 The commission carried "full power and 
authority to heare and receive, and to examine 
and determine, all complaints and appeales in 
all causes and matters, as well military as 
criminal and civil" (3 Doc. Rel. Col. Hist. 
N.Y., 64). Cf. 3 Osgood, op. cit., 183-84, that 
"the mild tone of their instructions had seemed 
to preclude such action [hearing appeals]." 
In some quarters the commission was stated 
to be one of oyer and terminer (4 Rec. Mass. 
Bay [Part ll], 197; Washburn, Sketches of 
the Early Judicial History of Massachusetts 
[1840], 35). But compare the terms of the 
instant commission with that of an English 
commission of oyer, and terminer in 1 Holdsworth, 
HEL, 669. It has also been asserted 
that "there can be no doubt but that the 
power of hearing and determining appeals was 
a violation of the charter, by which no such 
right had been reserved even to the king himself" 
(Kaye, op. cit., 87). 
362 3 Doc. Rel. Col. Hist. N.Y., 53. "You 
shall not receive any complaint of any thing 
done amisse by any Magistrate, except it appeares 
to be against their Charter, which is to 
regulate and bound all their actions; nor shall 
you interrupt ye proceedings in justice, by 
takeing upon you ye hearing and determining 
any particular right between party and party, 
but shall leave all matters of that nature to 
ye usuall proceedings in ye several! judicatories 
of ye country; except those proceedings be 
expressly contrary to ye rules prescribed by 
the Charter, or that the matters in difference 
doe arise from some expressions or clauses 
contained in some grant under our Great Seale 
of England: in all which you are to proceed 
according to justice, after a due examination 
of all matters and circumstances." 
363 It was complained that instead of being 
governed by rulers of their own choosing and 
laws of their own making, they would be 
subject to the arbitrary power of strangers, 
proceeding not under established law, but 
according to their own discretions; that officials 
in executing laws would be subject to complaints 
and appeals and to the determinations 
of new judges, whereby government would be 
rendered void and of no effect (1 Hutchinson, 
op. cit., 446-47). The Earl of Clarendon replied 
in March, 1664/5, that it could not be 
presumed that the King had or would leave 
his subjects in New England without redress 
by an appeal to him when proceedings had 
been irregular and against the rules of justice 
(ibid., 450-51).