doleance, a rehearing below might ensue. 174 But the exercise of such jurisdiction upon doleance was not uncontested by the local jurats. 175 There are other nonappellate causes and seemingly non-doleant causes in which a remand to the island "to better examine" some point is found. 176 During this early Stuart period the legal advisers continued to play a large part in the appellate process. It is observable that a greater number of definitive determinations emanated from this group than had earlier been the case. 177 However, the interrelation of the Board, the legal advisers, and the insular commissions or judiciaries is puzzling; in a given appeal it is difficult to predict the course which will be pursued. Seldom evident or articulate is the rationale upon which the Board decided to hear certain causes itself, to refer others to the legal advisers or to return others to the islands, although this question must have been of peculiar importance to the individual litigant 174 1n the case of In re Briard (supra, n. 173), Lord Carew, the Guernsey governor, was ordered to set down some impartial course by means of commissioners in the island or elsewhere for hearing and determining the matter or else for certification thereof to Lord Carew. In the case of In re de Carteret (supra, n. 173) the Royal Court of Jersey with the governor or lieutenant-governor present was to re-examine the cause, to admit such evidence as was produced, and to proceed to sentence. 175 In the case of In re Briard (ibid., 1616-17, 325) remonstrance was made to the appointed commissioners, nine Guernsey jurats (see supra, n. 174), that proceeding on the commission "would be very prejudiciall to the authority of their charter and the King's court there." The commission thereupon did not determine the cause, although it certified that the property in question belonged to Briard, but left it to the consideration of the Board. The Board, since the commission was grounded upon doleance and not appeal, ordered that the cause should be further heard before his Majesty's learned counsel in England, the jurats to send some of their number to be present if they thought fit. One reason for this objection may have been that one bailiff on the commission was from Jersey, a feature to which we have already seen objections made (supra, n. 89). This case may also be considered as a transitional step to the later doleance procedure, in which petitions of doleance were automatically referred to the appropriate Royal Court to answer before conciliar action was taken thereon; see infra, p. 284. 176 One Clement Grin et ux. complained that the Royal Court of Jersey confirmed to Thomas Poindexter and Benjamin Gavey a deed of gift obtained from Daniel Neel by sinister practices a few days before the decease of said Neel; diat by island law such gift was of no validity without forty days survival thereafter, but might be revoked by the next of kin (petitioner's wife here). The Royal Court was thereupon ordered to re-examine the validity of the deed in question by such evidence as should be produced, and to confirm or disallow the same. From such sentence the aggrieved party was to be allowed an appeal; "upon such appeale the sentence and reasons of the same be inserted, together with the examinacions of the witnesses, and whole proceedinges of the cause to bee exemplifyed under the seale of that isle" (In re Grin, APC, Bom., 1618-19, 311). 177 See Messervy v. de la Rocque (ibid., 1613- 14, 46); Baillehache v. Baillehache (ibid., 1615-16, 96); Dumaresq v. de Carteret (ibid., 1615-16, 169); Alford v. Guile (ibid., 1619- 21, 408); Burton v. Hampton (ibid., 1623-25, 82); Gosselin v. Blanche (ibid., 1621-23, 424- 25); Briard v. Mansell (ibid., 1621-23, 506); Peyton v. Herault (ibid., 1625-26, 116); Auley v. Le Jeune (PC 2/38/64); Blanche v. Quitteville (PC 2/39/384); cf. the action of the crown law officers upon the doleance of Edward Thompson. However, in addition to advising reversal or affirmance the legal advisers might accommodate the differences between the parties (De Vic v. Faleze, APC, Dom., 1613-14, 72; Marchant v. Marchant, ibid., 1619-21, 95), or they might advocate that the bailiff, assisted by some jurats, hear and determine all controversies between the parties without further appeal or petition to the Board (Girrard v. Girrard, ibid., 1623-25, 78).