court below. 113 But the instances in which hearings upon reference resulted 
in recommendations of affirmance or reversal were few; 114 the majority of 
the certificates of the legal advisers advocated a rehearing before commissioners 
in the islands. The reasons stated for advising insular rehearings are various. 
They include the nonappearance of the respondent before the legal advisers 
116 the dependence of the judgment on local law or custom, 110 the agreement 
of the parties, 117 the convenience 11S and the desire of the appellant. 119 
The related question arises as to the scope of the preliminary hearing or 
examination by the legal referees resulting in certification advocating insular 
rehearings. In some causes it clearly appears that the referees had reached 
a conclusion as to the erroneous character of the proceedings below. 120 In 
other instances it appears that no attempt was made to enter into the merits 
113 In Drake v. Macham (26 APC, Dom., 
350-51), the Royal Court was ordered upon 
arrival of appellant or his attorney to call before 
them such witnesses as were named, 
take their depositions and certify them to the 
Council, along with all other proceedings in 
the cause. In Anley v. Stocall (31 ibid., 342) 
Governor Raleigh was ordered to give directions 
that such persons as were produced 
should be examined as to their testimony in re 
the validity of certain wills. Bonds were also 
to be taken of the parties for their appearance 
at the Council Board for hearing before persons 
nominated by the Council. 
114 The legal advisers certified in favor of 
affirmance in Beauvoir v. De Vicke (15 APC, 
Dom., 336); In re Carteret (16 ibid., 4); 
Perin v. Perin (19 ibid., 35); Drake v. Macham 
(28 ibid., 246). In Harris v. Arthur (15 
ibid., 427) an agreement between the parties 
was certified. In de Carteret v. Dumaresq (29 
ibid., 620) the Solicitor General advised that 
the appeal was void for lack of prosecution 
within the time limited. In Blundell v. de 
Soulement (30 ibid., 474) Francis Bacon certified 
to the same effect. 
115 See supra, n. 105. 
116 De la Rocque v. de la Rocque (26 APC, 
Dom., 347) (question whether by will father 
could bequeath more of personalty to one child 
than to another). In Anley v. Stocall (32 
ibid., 478) the parties desired the cause to be 
heard in Jersey, "where the right and justnes 
of the cause might best be discerned." 
117 De Carteret v. Dumaresq (29 ibid., 67). 
118 Blundell v. Soulement (28 ibid., 514). It 
may be that absence of the respondent made 
it more convenient to have the rehearing in 
Jersey. 
119 Trachy v. Lempriere (31 ibid., 39). 
120 In Regina v. Beauvoir (21 APC, Dom., 
296) learned counsel certified that "the proceedinges 
in the behalf of the said Beauvoire 
have been very partiall, as well in respect that 
the Baylif was secluded from the sentence 
without anie apparrant just cause of exception, 
as also that two of the brethren-in-law 
of the said Beauvoir and one Harries, a Jurat, 
altogether affected to the said Beauvoire, were 
the men that did give this sentence." Governor 
Leighton was thereupon ordered "to 
cause this matter againe to be fully and deliberatlye 
heard by indyfferent Jurates, and 
such as shall not be carried with anie parcialitie 
or affection." In Macham v. Carey (30 ibid., 
250) learned counsel represented that "sentence 
was made contrarie to the lawes, customes, 
and privileges of the Island." Thereupon 
Governor Leighton was directed to appoint 
"some discreete and sufficient persons 
of that Island, such as are not helde partiall 
and have not bin dealers in the behalfe of 
either partie heretofore, uprightlie to heare 
and determine this cause." In Harris v. de la 
March (25 ibid., 169) the appeal was found 
good by the referees, since appellant was not 
permitted to produce proofs and witnesses 
below, but had to hazard the cause on his 
adversary's oath. However, the hearing and 
ending of the cause was committed by consent 
of the parties to certain commissioners 
nominated by them. Cf. de la Rocque v. de la 
Rocque where an opinion was reached upon 
ex parte representations, but the adversary was 
provided with opportunity to change this opinion 
(26 ibid., 32).