formation to be found in the Council registers. To some extent the procedure is indicated by the terms of the various references. 106 It is evident that in many cases the parties were heard ore tenus by the legal advisers, 107 who evinced a dislike for ex parte hearings. 108 In some cases counsel, as well as the parties themselves, were heard. 109 In addition to parties to the appeal, members of the island judiciary might be directed to appear before the referees. 110 The scope of the review power exercised by the legal advisers was broad, including errors both of law and of fact. 111 Essentially a rehearing of the cause took place, at which additional evidence not introduced below might be submitted. This is indicated by the terms of certain references to the legal advisers 112 and by several orders for the taking of additional evidence in the 106 These references included: "To examine the appeale" (Perin v. Perin, 18 APC, Dom., 386); "that you will heare the same cause of appeale" (Rowse v. Gower, 21 ibid., 299); to certify their opinions "when you have enformed your selves throughlie of all pointes of substance or difficultie" (Gallie v. de la Rocque, 25 ibid., 144); to call before them the parties, and upon knowledge taken of the case by the petitions, informations, evidences and such proofs as should be exhibited and by the former proceedings to make a final order (de la Rocque v. de la Rocque, 28 ibid., 297); to examine two petitions, one of appeal, another of complaint, exhibited against appellant, to have the parties appear before them, with such proofs and witnesses as they could produce, and to proceed to set down a final order (Harris v. Arthur, 15 ibid., 403). 107 See particularly Paine v. Fautrat (14 ibid., 31); Perin v. Perin (19 ibid., 36) ("upon hearing of the matter at large debated"). 108 In Gallie v. Maugier (25 ibid., 151) the legal advisers reported that "by reason of the absence of the adverse partie they cannot indifferentlie judge of the full substance of the matter," so a hearing was ordered by a Jersey commission. In Macham v. Carey (30 ibid. the legal advisers reported that "the appeale coulde not be proceeded in as it ought to have bin" because of respondent's absence. But cf. the enigmatic statement in Marchant v. Beauvoir (29 ibid., 489), that "the appeales which are made from the sentences given by the Bail iff es and Jurattes of the Isles of Guernsey and Jerzey are to receave an ordinary tryall either with the appealant or defendant." See also Rowse v. Gower (21 ibid., 298) where when an appeal was referred to the crown law officers, they were of opinion the adverse party should be summoned. In Beauvoir v. Carey (30 ibid., 736) a new hearing was ordered when Governor Leighton alleged that he was prejudiced by a former order after a hearing at which he was not represented. 109 For hearings of both parties and counsel at large see de Carteret v. Dumaresq (30 ibid., 161); Beauvoir v. Beauvoir (28 ibid., 596). 110 In Paine v. Fautrat (14 ibid., 47) "some of the Justices" were "to repaire hither to awnswere the validitie of a sentence given by them." In the same cause the bailiff was directed to be present, probably because of his petition for repeal of a conciliar letter as prejudicial to the administration of Guernsey justice (14 ibid., 31). 111 See particularly the 1580 conciliar regulations for Guernsey, supra, pp. 13-14. 112 In Harris v. Arthur the legal referees were to cause the parties "together with such proofes and wytnesses as should be produced" to appear before them (15 APC, Dom., 404). In de la Rocque v. de la Rocque the legal advisers were to take knowledge "of the state of the cause by the peticions, informacions, evidences, and such proofes as they shall exhibite unto you" (28 ibid., 297); cf. supra, n. 106. In Gosselin v. Blundell (29 ibid., 570) the bailiff and jurats were ordered to deliver to the parties all writings produced at the original hearing, especially a certain compromise between the parties which appellant complained was withheld from him. Directions upon reference of an appeal to include the former proceedings in the cause (supra, p. 17) would certainly be redundant if review jurisdiction were confined to errors appearing in the record.