was largely lacking in standardization. 96 Despite the wide use made of commissions, it should not be overlooked that the royal courts could be ordered to rehear a cause. 97 In short, the conspicuous element of this aspect of conciliar jurisdiction is the total lack of formalization. No pattern is discoverable for prediction as to the future course of a specific appeal before the Council Board. In most cases the appeal was not dealt with so summarily by the Council. Instead, the petition of appeal and ancillary petitions presented in the course of the appellate proceedings were referred by the Council to members of a group which may be conveniently termed the conciliar legal advisers. 98 This group was loosely composed of the crown law officers, various judicial figures, and "learned counsell." 99 The terms of the individual references made to the legal advisers varied. A reference might contain authority to examine and settle an appeal if possible; if not, to certify the proceedings therein to the Council. 100 Or a reference might only authorize an examination of an appeal and certification of opinion therein. 101 The certificate returned by the legal judgment and certify their proceedings to the Council Board (Le Hagais v. Cabot, supra, n. 93; Lawrence v. Fourneaux, 19 APC, Dom., 140). Or if the commissioners could not settle the cause, they might be ordered to take bonds of the parties to appear before" the Privy Council in prosecution of an appeal and to certify their proceedings (Payne v. Constant, supra, n. 92; Rowse v. Labey, supra, n. 93; Le Porke v. Mountes, supra, n. 92). 96 Signeur de Rosol, Hampton Stocker, la Rocher, or any two thereof {In re Goalement, supra, n. 92); the governor of Jersey, three jurats, and two others, or any three, four or five thereof (Godfrey v. Messervy, supra, n. 92); the governor of Guernsey, and three named persons, or any two or three thereof (Sare v. Lempriere, supra, n. 93); the governor of Jersey and three others, or any three thereof (Le Porke v. Mountes, supra, n. 92). 97 De Soulement v. de Soulement, supra, n. 95; Le Hagais v. Cabot, supra, n. 93; Lawrence v. Fourneaux, supra, n. 95. 98 See inter alia Harris v. Arthur (15 APC, Dom., 403); Perin v. Perin (18 ibid., 386); Rowse v. Gower (21 ibid., 298); Regina v. Beauvoir (21 ibid., 296); Gallie v. de la Rocque (25 ibid., 144); Blundell v. de Soulement (28 ibid., 514); Herault v. Nicholes (31 ibid., 251). 99 Among the various references are the following: to "her Majesty's Learned Counsaile" (28 APC, Dom., 557); to her Majesty's learned counsel or any of them (28 ibid., 515); to the Attorney General and the Solicitor (16 ibid., 4); to the Master of the Rolls, the Solicitor and Dr. Hammond (14 ibid., 31); to Judge of the Admiralty Caesar (29 ibid., 72); to Francis Bacon (28 ibid., 538); to the Solicitor General and Recorder of London (26 ibid., 32); to Council Clerk Beale and Dr. Dunne (30 ibid., 736). In the earlier appeals the Attorneys and Solicitors General are the most frequent referees; toward the end of the period the Solicitor General is most prominent. In one instance the respective governors of Jersey and Guernsey were joined with Solicitor General Francis Bacon and the Recorder of London "to the end that, by joyning the knowledg of the customes of the said Islandes togither with the rule of law and justice, you may consider of such an ende and agreement betwixt them as may be agreable both to law and good conscience" (28 ibid., 296). Dr. Hammond is also mentioned as one acquainted with island causes (13 ibid., 160). As to his Majesty's "learned counsel," see 6 Holdsworth, HEL, 472-74. 100 Harris v. Arthur (15 APC, Dom., 403); Perin v. Perin (18 ibid., 386). In the former case the referees were to bind the parties to appear before the Council in case of inability to settle the cause. 101 In Gallie v. de la Rocque (25 APC, Dom., 144), the Board wrote that "we have thought