to the Queen and her Privy Council if made within fifteen days after notice of judgment. But exceptions to this general direction were made in the case of causes criminal or corrective, of orders in the Court of Chief Pleas, of cries of haro, of matters movable not exceeding sterling, of causes where no definitive decree, sentence, or judgment had been given. Appellants were effectually to prosecute and end their appeals within a year and a day, if not hindered by any lawful impediment, and to give security to prosecute the appeal and to pay adversarial costs and charges in case of affirmance, according to ancient island custom. The appellant was required to procure an instrument under seal containing all the acts and proceedings in the cause appealed. The Royal Court was to enter in its records all pleadings and evidence submitted in each cause, and copies thereof were to be afforded appellants upon payment of the usual fees. 77 The Jersey regulation of 1572 was supplemented toward the latter part of Elizabeth's reign by the ordinances of two royal commissioners, Pine and Napper, dispatched to Jersey. 78 In their ordinances of 1591 it was declared that the bailiff and the jurats ought to have the final determination of "all matters whatsoever which concern criminal cases, offenses, or misdemeanors." Also, that no appeal or other form of relief, except for review by jurats, should be lawful in causes under the value of sterling. In addition, it was related that there had been many appeals in cases in which no definitive sentence had been given, in cases which were well judged and wrongly appealed, in criminal causes, and in other causes in which no appeal lay. It was therefore ordered that in such cases, in which any request was made to the Council, petitioners should forfeit to the crown sterling. This sanction was also applicable to those who prosecuted causes in Chancery, in the Star Chamber, or in any other court of England except before the Council. 79 With this description of the appellate body and its jurisdiction before us, it remains to deal with its procedure in handling appeals. Having taken his appeal in the court below, 80 the appellant utilized the usual procedural device 77 iMndsdowne MS, 155/429, printed in Safford and Wheeler, Practice of the Privy Council in Judicial Matters (1901), 247-48. As to clameur de haro see 1 Les Manuscrits de Philippe le Geyt, equyer, lieutcnant-bailli de I'lle de Jersey, sur la Constitution, les Lois, et les Usages de cette lie (1846), 294-96; Le Quesne, Constitutional History of Jersey (1856), 38-39; Le Cras, The Laws, Customs, and Privileges, and Their Administration, in the Island of Jersey (1839), 125; Warburton, Treatise on the History, Laws and Customs of the Island of Guernsey (1822), 100-101. 7S On the issuance of this commission see 20 APC, Dom., 244, 275-81, 288; cf. Dasent, ibid., xxx; 4 Le Geyt, op. cit., 237 et seq. 79 Case of Respondent in Renouf v. Attorney General for Jersey, Appen. I, 28. The validity of these ordinances has been challenged (Le Quesne, op. cit., 213-14), but in Renouf v. Attorney General for Jersey, [1936] A.C. 445, 464-65, the Judicial Committee felt constrained to regard the ordinances as "part of the law of Jersey." 80 By the 1580 regulation for Guernsey, appeals were to be made at the time of sentence