ceased to visit the islands after 1331, and only a few royal commissions to hear and determine specific causes are to be found. 57 From this it appears that the judicial needs of the islanders were being satisfied by the local royal courts in Jersey and in Guernsey. These two courts were holding pleas of the crown previous to 1331 —the distinction between pleas of the crown and other pleas having been obliterated. 08 This obliteration received recognition by the terms of the judicial power inserted in commissions to the wardens. 59 Judicial authority consequently became concentrated in the respective bailiffs and jurats, but in view of the institutional parturition taking place within the realm itself, at some point a decision must have been necessary to determine which body should exercise appellate supervision. But the rationale of the decision which gave the King in Council such jurisdiction is wrapped in obscurity. It may have been a Norman institutional survival that appeals were taken to the King in Council, really in his ducal capacity. 60 It may have been the result of a recognition that the islands were outside the realm and that the King's writ did not run therein. 01 It may have resulted from abeyance of the error jurisdiction of the House of Lords. 62 As to the date of conciliar assumption of this jurisdiction, it has been asserted that the Council became hearers of appeals from the Channel Islands at the end of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century. 63 It has also been alleged that this Privy Council jurisdiction was usurped, that it originally belonged to the Council in Star Chamber. 64 At any rate, in 1495 it was necessary to issue a conciliar order restricting appeals "au Roy et i Con- Palmer 54); Anonymous (1 Ventris 357); Rex v. Overton (1 Sid. 386). 57 Le Patourel, op. cit., 66. 58 Ibid. ™Ibid., 128. 60 See Extentes of Guernsey, 147, 150; Le Patourel, op. cit., 29; cf. Macqueen, op. cit., 682-85. 61 By analogy to the King's Bench practice; see supra, p. 10. 62 Macqueen, op. cit., 686; 2 Anson, op. cit., Part 11, 321; Keith, op. cit., 305; cf. Palgrave, op. cit., Ill; Plucknett, Concise History of the Common Law (3d ed., 1940), 185. The nadir of interpretation is attained by Beauchamp (Jurisprudence of the Privy Council [1891], 8-9). Generally on the decline of the error jurisdiction of the House of Lords see Hale, Jurisdiction of the House of Lords (1796), v—viii; Maitland, op. cit., 245-46; Petit-Dutaillis and Lefebure, Studies and Notes Supplementary to Stubb's Constitutional History 111 (1929), 442; Pickthorn, Early Tudor Government, Henry VII (1934), 117-18; Beven, Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords, 17 LQR 163-64. 03 Haver, op. cit., in 39 Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des Chartes, 53; Macqueen, op. cit., 686; cf. Percy, The Privy Council under the Tudors (1907), 7; Dicey, The Privy Council (1887), 90. 64 See Hudson, A Treatise of the Court of Star Chamber, 2 Collectanea Juridica (1792), 62. But this jurisdictional assertion is not borne out by the records. For Star Chamber original jurisdiction over the Channel Islands see 1 List of Proceedings in the Court of Star Chamber Preserved in the Public Record Office, 1485-1558; 13 P.R.O. Lists and Indexes, 36, 53, 82, 85, 174, 184, 197, 262. On earlier seventeenthcentury objections to Star Chamber jurisdiction over the Channel Islands see All Souls College MS, 204/5. As to the distinction between the Star Chamber and the Privy Council under Henry VII see Schofield, A Study of the Court of Star Chamber (1900), 26-29.