continental precedents thrown in. 135 This tolerance of exotic citation, far from 
evidencing a single common law, suggests an eclecticism which one would expect 
in any judicial body exercising supervisory authority over dissimilar legal 
establishments. 
The issue in the Welsh case was referred to the crown. Edward took the 
position that although he was prepared to observe reasonable Welsh law, his 
coronation oath bound him to extirpate bad custom. 136 However, he subsequently 
resolved, with agreement of his magnates, to follow the precedents 
of his forebears, this usage to be settled by a search of Treasury rolls and by 
an inquest on the grounds. 137 The result of this was apparently of a nature to 
justify further proceeding according to the course of the common law of 
England. But the issue was not finally adjudicated. Hostilities were resumed 
and after the Welsh were defeated the Statute of Rhuddlan (1284) was pro- 
mulgated. 
The Edwardian settlement has been characterized as an acceptance of the 
medieval doctrine that "local law should conform to a higher law and be adjusted 
by it." 13S The fact is that it was nothing of the sort, for the statute, 
while it introduced considerable English law, made certain savings of Welsh 
law both in terms and by implication. The crown reserved a power of interpretation, 
the warrant for subsequent interference by prerogative writs, but 
the statute was silent on mechanisms for review, a strange omission, if Edward 
indeed had cherished the intentions ascribed to him. As a consequence, Wales 
was not drawn into the orbit of the error jurisdiction of King's Bench. After 
Edward of Carnarvon was made Prince of Wales, appeals were directed to 
him, 139 and the same practice was probably followed under the Black 
Prince. 140 The English courts eventually asserted that jurisdiction in error lay 
with Parliament. 141 
135 j p a lgrave, Documents and Records Illustrating 
the History of Scotland (1837), 29, 38- 
39, 43- 
138 Davies, op. cit., 60. The letter of Archbishop 
Peckham summarized ibid., 64, was written 
after Edward I's announcement. Peckham 
argues that a royal custom has vigor as law 
greater than a custom of the people: "Magis 
videtur legem facere consuetudo regius cuius 
voluntas legis habet vigorem quam consuetudo 
aliqua subditorum," an obvious application of 
the Roman law "quod principi placuit" (1 
Registorum epistolarum Fr. ]oh. Peckham 
[Martin ed. 1882] 136). 
137 Edwards, Calendar of Ancient Correspondence 
concerning Wales (1935), 60. 
138 2 Powicke, op. cit., 667. 
139 Record of Caernarvon (1838), 212, 214. 
140 This rests on inference. Business not dispatched 
at an eyre is adjourned to the Prince's 
council (1 Black Prince's Register [1930] 59)- 
On two occasions commissions issued to hear 
errors and reverse them in Denbigh, a lordship 
then attached to North Wales (3 ibid., 406 
[1361] 463 [1364]). The power to commission 
implies, of course, the power in the council to 
hear and determine. Note, also, the allegation 
that in South Wales by the law and usage causes 
were justiciable in the principality saving only 
the Prince's causes (1 ibid., 59). 
141 YB 19 Hen. VI, 12. In 1393 the Council 
entertained a complaint in error from South 
Wales and remanded the case for settlement 
there (Cal. Pat. Rolls 1391-96, 359). The several 
lordships were then in the King's hands.