and influential as the canon law with its concepts of review no doubt was in 
the transformation of the nature of such proceedings, neither could furnish 
the solution to the problem basic in medieval thinking about the judicial 
process, that the judge must possess capacity to speak law (tus dicere) responsively 
both as to litigants and to the place of their abode. This problem was one 
that possessed a certain emotional color, and the elements that entered into 
the creation of this feeling about law were various. We have in the first place 
the notion that the free and lawful man was born into the law as into a species 
of inheritance, a legacy of the time when the principle of personal law xli prevailed. 
The manner and form in which this notion survived the progressive 
territorialization of the law in western Europe 115 was conditioned mainly 
upon the extent to which the individual remained an active participant in 
the actual administration of justice. 116 In the second place, those possessed of 
114 On the personal law of the folklaw period 
cf. 1 Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte (2d 
ed.), 382 et seq. Following the Norman conquest 
and colonization of England, the personal 
principle is followed as a matter of expediency; 
e.g., William's duel ordinance, Englishry, and 
the sufferance of the wergeld system. The 
pressure of territorialization already at work in 
Anglo-Saxon England is manifest in the regional 
distinctions set out in Leges Henrici 6; 
6, 2. The subsequent policy of the King's courts 
toward tolerated aberrations from the consuetudines 
regni is in terms of place. As a result, 
what had at one time been enjoyed as 
stem-law is available only ratione loci. The 
concept of the legal man which at the time of 
conquest drew substance both from stem-law 
and place law receives a new content at the 
hands of the common law courts. On early development 
of the concept on the continent see 
Goebel, Felony and Misdemeanor, 251 et seq. 
On the inheritance of the common law see 
Goebel, Cases and Materials on the Development 
of Legal Institutions (1946), 174 et seq. 
According to Liebermann, early indications of 
this notion in Leges Henrici 8, 7 {cf. 2 Gesetze 
der Angelsachsen, Glossar, s.v. Recht 4a). In the 
Articuli Willelmi Retracti (c. 1210), the right 
to free enjoyment of lands free of tallage, etc., 
is allegedly granted iure hereditaria in perpetuum 
(1 ibid., 490). 
116 The persistence of the personal principle is 
illustrated in the Sachsenspiegel I, 16 § I 
(Hohmeyer ed.) ("Nieman ne mach irwerven 
ander recht, wan als im an geboren is") Cf. 
Schtvabenspiegel, c. 13 (Gengler ed.), and 
Fehr, Staatsauffassung Eik.es von Repgau, in 37 
Zeitsch. der Savigny Stiftung fur Rechtsgeschichte 
(Germ. Abt.), 201. The principle of 
the Sachsenspiegel is to some extent exemplified 
in the Welshry of Wales (cf. Rees, South Wales 
and the March [1924] 29 et seq., 94 et seq.). 
The personal principle of the folklaw period is 
supposed to have vanished in France during the 
tenth century (Declareuil, Histoire generale du 
droit francais [1925], 829). This is probably 
correct if confined to the persistence of a particular 
stem-law. Obviously the personal principle 
retained some vigor, for the law followed 
the person in the conquest of England, Sicily, 
and in the founding of the crusaders' state. 
Note, further, that owing to the geographical 
complexity of tenures it became usual to distinguish 
between incidents governed by the status 
of the land and those governed by the status of 
the individual (Mitteis, Lehnrecht und Staatsgewalt, 
230 et seq.). Even if the latter was fixed 
by the law of a territory, its extraterritorial 
effects appear to be a recognition of the personal 
principle. 
116 In England, on the level of royal justice, by 
the use of recognitions and juries, grand and 
petit. In France the participation is signal in 
some of the earlier custumals (e.g., Tres ancien 
coutumier de Normandie [Tardif ed.], c. 26; 
Beaumanoir, Coutumes de Beauvaisis [Salmon 
ed.], no. 1760). This interest in maintaining 
the customary law is no less where the judging 
function is by representatives or jurats; e.g., the 
Channel Islands, or Dax (Abbadie, Le Livre 
noir etles etablissements de Dax [1902], lxxiv). 
The Romanization of French laws, royal and 
seignorial pressure all tended toward the destruction 
of individual participation. The gap