the judge, in the second the deviation from procedural norms, and in the last 
the error of substantive law. 90 Under certain circumstances, it was asserted, 
unjust sentences could be reformed, and although the learned opinion differed 
on what was the proper combination of conditions, there was general agreement 
that where a judge had been misled by fraud or stealth there should be 
reversal. 01 
On the basis of these ideas there was evolved a remedy extraordinary, the 
retractatio, which we shall presently examine, but we must first speak of the 
absorption of the ethical postulates of the canon law by the common law, for 
this process preceded any dalliance with any devices of review—indeed, it 
was a condition precedent to such happening. The resort to the canonical conceptions 
was forecast by the Leges Henrici where the falsum iudicium is rechristened 
iniustum iudicium. 9 ' 2 It is evident in the prototypes of the writ of 
novel disseisin, where the judge is commanded to deal justly in a complaint 
of a disseisin done unjustly and without judgment, 03 and thenceforward admonition 
of just doing and reprobation of unjust acts are commonplaces in 
royal mandates. But more remarkable for our purposes is the reference in 
1225 to the "unjust judgment" of the Irish court ° 4 because two errors in law 
had been made, an acceptance of the identification which the canonists had 
long been making of the error in law as injustice. 
It was the play with these ideas, we think, which finally suggested a rationalization 
of the strange inconsistency of maintaining a rule of an unimpeachable 
record and nevertheless tinkering with the judgments of Kings' judges. 
This tour de force was done by Bracton in a passage where he amplifies the 
doctrine of the just judgment in a manner that makes certain inferences inescapable. 
Bracton comes upon the matter in his discussion of judgments 
rendered as a result of compulsion by the King. 06 Under such circumstances, 
says Bracton, what is done is not by way of judgment, but because the King so 
wishes it. Hence it follows that the judgment (if it can at all be called a judgment) 
is willful and not just. Whatever may be said of the King's act because 
90 These ideas are set out in Causa XI, q. 111, 
especially the dictum, c. 65. Paucapalea has 
virtually a mere repetition {cf. Die Summa des 
Paucapalea [Schulte ed., 1890], 78); the 
Summa Rolandi is more discursive {cf. 
Thaner, Die Summa Magistri Rolandi [1874], 
25—6). The most extensive discussion is by 
Rufinus {cf. Die Summa Magistri Rufini 
[Schulte ed., 1892], 276 et seq.). The distinctions 
are noted in the Bamberg ordo {supra n. 
89) c. 21. Stephen of Tournai transcribes from 
Rolandus {cf. Die Summa des Stephanus 
Tornacensis [Schulte ed., 1891] 213). 
91 Based on the Decretum, Causa XXXV, q. IX, 
c. 1, 2. Cf. the Summa Rolandi, supra n. 90, 
233; Summa Rufini, supra n. 90, 464. 
92 Leges Henrici, 10. On the compiler's canonical 
sources, see Liebermann, Über die Leges 
Henrici (1901), 23. 
93 Eigelow, Placita Anglo-Normannica, 128, 
130, 250. 
94 Supra p. xxxi. 
95 De legibus, f. 369